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THE VANISHING CORE OF JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
Evan C. Zoldan* 
With Congress firmly in control of the jurisdiction, resources, and structure 
of the federal courts, the scope of the judiciary’s independence is limited indeed. 
If there is an attribute that can be considered the core of judicial independence, it 
is the power of the federal courts to decide cases pending before them. In a pair 
of recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has called into question whether 
the federal judiciary possesses even this limited attribute of independence. This 
Article examines how the Court has blurred the line between the judicial and leg-
islative powers by ceding to Congress the authority to direct federal courts to de-
cide pending cases for particular parties. After identifying the thorny issues that 
the Court has left unsettled, this Article suggests an approach to resolving them 
that preserves both Congress’s role in lawmaking as well as the core of the judi-
ciary’s independence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the history of the Roberts Court is written, the independence of the 
judiciary will be one of its central themes. Indeed, Roberts’s preoccupation 
with the decisional independence of judges—that is, whether individual judges 
make decisions free of bias—was evident even before his confirmation as Chief 
Justice. In a well-known exchange during his Senate confirmation hearing, 
then-Judge Roberts proclaimed his vision of judicial independence: “Judges are 
like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. . . . [A]nd I will 
remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”1 As 
Chief Justice, Roberts has continued to emphasize his vision of the judicial 
role, explaining that judges “do not advance political positions;”2 “[we] do not 
sit on opposite sides of an aisle, we do not caucus in separate rooms, we do not 
 
1  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) [here-
inafter John Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to 
be Chief Justice of the United States). 
2  JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN 
ROBERTS 11 (2019). 
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serve one party or one interest. We serve one nation.”3 And in a remarkably 
pointed public defense of the courts in the face of growing accusations of their 
partisan leanings, the Chief Justice responded: “[w]e do not have Obama judges 
or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. What we have is an extraordi-
nary group of dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right to those 
appearing before them.”4 
Although Roberts is not alone in asserting that judges exercise decisional 
independence,5 skeptics often overshadow the defenders of this position.6 Per-
haps most vociferously, former President Trump made clear his position that 
judges who ruled against his favored policies in litigation are “activists,” that 
the Court of the Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is “out of control,” and that the 
United States court system itself is “broken and unfair.”7 Perhaps not surpris-
 
3  University of Minnesota Law School, The 2018 Stein Lecture: John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief 
Justice of the United States, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9 
i3RwW0y_kE [https://perma.cc/2LWX-X4C5]; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, 
ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertss-
rules/305559/ [https://perma.cc/FFF8-6DLC] (describing Roberts’s interest in the public’s 
perception of the Court as an “impartial institution that transcends partisan politics”). 
4  Mark Sherman, Roberts, Trump Spar in Extraordinary Scrap Over Judges, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Nov. 21, 2018), https://apnews.com/c4b34f9639e141069c08cf1e3deb6b84 [https://pe 
rma.cc/BUG6-AEZW]. Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence on the independence of 
the judiciary stems from the concern that a loss of the public’s support could lead to a loss of 
the judiciary’s power. Political science literature suggests that Supreme Court justices “have 
strong incentives to be concerned with their public standing. They recognize that erosion of 
public support and institutional legitimacy has negative consequences for the Court’s power 
and institutional integrity.” Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and 
Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 973 (2009). 
5  Bill Mears, O’Connor: Don’t Call Us ‘Activist Judges,’ CNN (Nov. 28, 2006, 2:31 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/27/mears.judicialindependence/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8XLU-EACS] (reporting statements from Justices O’Connor and Breyer about the 
importance of judicial independence). 
6  Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 
315 (1999) (noting that attacks on judicial independence have “become part of orchestrated 
strategies of political parties and other groups”). 
7  In His Own Words: The President’s Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 
14, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/his-own-words-preside 
nts-attacks-courts [https://perma.cc/664M-PZ78]. While much of President Trump’s rhetoric 
is unique to him, the amorphous accusation of “judicial activism” has a long history: Repub-
lican Party platforms since at least 1996 have insisted that judicial activism is a feature of 
judges appointed by Democrats. President George W. Bush campaigned on the promise of 
appointing “strict constructionist” judges rather than “liberal activist judges.” Neil S. Siegel, 
Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 557–58, 564 (2010). 
Accusations of judicial activism come from the political left, as well. Dean Chemerinsky 
characterized the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision as “a stunning example of judi-
cial activism by its five most conservative justices.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Conservatives Em-
brace Judicial Activism in Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2010, 12:00 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-jan-22-la-oe-chemerinsky22-2010jan2 
2-story.html [https://perma.cc/A9N2-GDUG]; see also Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independ-
ence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regu-
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ingly, some commentators have argued that the general public also tends to 
view the Supreme Court in partisan terms, reposing their confidence in the 
Court when a president from their preferred party successfully appoints a jus-
tice and withdrawing their confidence when the appointment is made by a pres-
ident from the opposing party.8 
Even if Roberts’s “balls and strikes” metaphor rings hollow to many,9 there 
is widespread agreement that judges should exercise decisional independence 
when adjudicating individual disputes.10 However, there is less agreement 
about whether the judiciary has or should have institutional independence,11 
that is, whether there is some judicial authority that cannot be controlled by the 
political branches.12 There are a number of values that have been attributed to 
 
lation of Congress, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 155 (2003) (noting the bipartisan nature of accusations 
of judicial activism). 
8  Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in Judicial Branch Up, Executive Branch Down, GALLUP (Sept. 20, 
2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/219674/trust-judicial-branch-executive-branch-down.asp 
x [https://perma.cc/7BQU-NM49] (“With conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch joining the Su-
preme Court in April, Republicans’ trust in the judicial branch has surged over the past 
year . . . . Democrats are now less trusting in the federal judiciary.”). Scholars debate the ex-
tent to which members of the public tend to support the Court even if it does not rule “their 
way.” Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 
2240, 2252 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE 
SUPREME COURT (2018)). 
9  Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY L.J. 641, 641 (2012) (“John Roberts has been 
both praised and scorned for the metaphor he presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee at 
the hearing on his confirmation to be Chief Justice of the United States: ‘[I]t’s my job to call 
balls and strikes.’ ”); Jon D. Michaels, Baller Judges, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 411, 413 (“[Judges] 
shouldn’t style themselves umpires because, quite frankly, umpire-judging is often impossi-
ble in any case involving anything more than fact or credibility adjudication.”). 
10  E.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of 
Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 967 (2007) (“[A]ll who act as judges are expected to 
exercise independent judgment, in the sense of being impartial as between the parties and not 
having a personal stake in the dispute . . . .”); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Inde-
pendent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 962, 965 (2002) (arguing that it is universally agreed that “decisional independence, 
meaning judges’ ability to adjudicate facts and interpret law in particular cases ‘free from 
any outside pressure: personal, economic, or political, including any fear of reprisal’ ” is a 
virtue). 
11  Jackson, supra note 10 (“While all who act as judges are expected to exercise independent 
judgment . . . there is disagreement about how independent from the public, or from elected 
political branches, judges should be in interpreting and applying the law.”); Geyh, supra note 
7, at 160 (“We can only hypothesize as to whether Congress has the power or authority to 
punish a judge for making an unpopular decision by labeling it a high misdemeanor and re-
moving her on that basis, or by cutting her budget, or abolishing the judgeship she occupies, 
or by depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction . . . .”). 
12  Burbank, supra note 6, at 320 (arguing that the standard view of judicial independence 
assures that “judges free of congressional and executive control will be in a position to de-
termine whether the assertion of power against the citizen is consistent with law”); Charles 
Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial Branch in the 
New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 32 (1998) (proposing that judicial review requires 
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independence in this institutional sense; most saliently, institutional independ-
ence allows judges to uphold rights of citizens against the government13 and 
police disputes among its three branches.14 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized 
the importance of the institutional independence of the courts as well, explain-
ing that the federal courts are tasked with ensuring that the political branches 
act within the confines of the law.15 
Despite these justifications for institutional independence, there are also 
good reasons for the political branches to exert at least some control over the 
judiciary. After all, another way to describe judicial dependence is judicial ac-
countability. Judges are unelected and cannot be removed except under unusual 
circumstances; as a result, dependence on the political branches can be seen as 
an indispensable mechanism for ensuring that judges apply law that has been 
enacted through democratic channels.16 Moreover, it is possible to overstate the 
tension between judicial accountability and judicial independence. Professor 
Burbank has argued that judicial independence and judicial accountability can 
be thought of as “complementary concepts” rather than “concepts at war with 
each other.”17 
But, no matter whether judicial independence and judicial accountability 
are complementary or in tension with one another, the relationship between 
these two concepts manifests itself in a number of seemingly intractable con-
ceptual and doctrinal problems. This Article considers one of these perennial 
problems: whether Congress may direct a federal court to decide a pending dis-
pute for a particular party. On one hand, the power to write laws for courts to 
follow is squarely part of Congress’s lawmaking authority.18 On the other hand, 
 
that “the courts possess the means to protect their institutional integrity against unconstitu-
tional political branch encroachments”). 
13  Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 968 (“[P]olitical actors face pressures to abandon or 
subvert legal rules for legally inappropriate reasons.”); Jackson, supra note 10, at 969 (not-
ing that judges were made independent to, inter alia, “protect minorities from popular pas-
sions”). 
14  Jackson, supra note 10, at 969 (noting that judges were made independent to, inter alia, 
“check the other branches of government when they departed from the fundamental com-
mitments set forth in the Constitution”). 
15  University of Minnesota Law School, supra note 3. 
16  Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 965 (“Yet everyone also agrees that certain forms 
of popular or legislative pressure are not only permissible, but indispensable.”); Jackson, su-
pra note 10, at 997 (“Legitimate constitutional government, moreover, requires both inde-
pendent courts and effective democratic participation in governance.”). 
17  Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
323, 325 (2003) (“An accountable judiciary without any independence is weak and feeble. 
An independent judiciary without any accountability is dangerous.”). 
18  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . . .”); JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 405 (3d ed. 2016) (noting that applying rules of decision is precisely what 
courts do). 
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courts are empowered to adjudicate disputes pending before them.19 Most of the 
time, these two powers coexist without any conceptual or practical difficulty: 
after Congress writes a generally applicable law, a court applies the law to a 
particular factual situation. However, conflict arises when Congress writes a 
law that is so narrow that it guarantees the outcome in a particular, pending 
case. When it writes a statute with this level of specificity, Congress walks 
perilously close to the line that separates the judicial power from the legislative 
power.20 
Now is the right time to reconsider the fuzzy line separating the legislative 
and judicial functions. Widespread criticism of the federal courts, including in-
creasingly pointed accusations of political bias, have precipitated renewed pop-
ular and scholarly interest in measures to curb the influence of the federal 
courts,21 including proposals to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over par-
ticular subject matters.22 The Supreme Court, too, has waded into the murky 
subject of judicial independence in a pair of recent cases, Bank Markazi v. Pe-
terson23 and Patchak v. Zinke.24 In these cases, the Court considered statutes 
that explicitly picked a winning party in a pending case and directed the federal 
court to rule accordingly. In both of these cases, the Court upheld the statutes. 
In doing so, the Court expanded the scope of Congress’s authority to make law 
at the expense of the judiciary’s power to adjudicate. How far Congress may 
expand its authority at the expense of the judicial power is the subject of this 
Article. 
In Part I, I will argue that the core of judicial independence is vanishing. 
By constitutional design, Congress is firmly in control of the jurisdiction, re-
 
19  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in . . . inferior Courts . . . .”). 
20  For a discussion of the line between the judicial and legislative power, see Evan C. 
Zoldan, The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing Solution, 74 WASH. & LEE. 
L. REV. 2133, 2148–72 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, Klein]. 
21  TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 5–6 (2011). 
22  Christopher Jon Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power and the Process of Constitutional 
Change, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1778, 1780–81 (2020) (arguing for broad congressional power 
under the Exceptions Clause); Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial In-
dependence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 471 (2018) (arguing that political actors treat many 
court-curbing measures as out of bounds although this restraint is not compelled by constitu-
tional text, structure, or history); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Atticus DeProspo, Against 
Congressional Case Snatching, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 791 (2021) (arguing for a broad 
rendering of a principle that prevents Congress from directing federal courts to reach particu-
lar judgments in pending cases). 
23  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1322–23 (2016). For a discussion and critique 
of Bank Markazi, see Evan C. Zoldan, Bank Markazi and the Undervaluation of Legislative 
Generality, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y L. REV. INTER ALIA 1, 1 (2016) [hereinafter Zoldan, Bank 
Markazi]. 
24  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018). 
21 NEV. L.J. 531 
Spring 2021]    VANISHING CORE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 537 
 
sources, and structure of the federal courts.25 Congress’s control is so pervasive, 
in fact, that scholars have long struggled to articulate what authority, if any, 
stands at the core of the judiciary’s independence.26 After considering different 
possible formulations of judicial independence, I conclude that the core of judi-
cial independence should be seen as the courts’ authority to decide disputes 
pending before them without legislative direction. This version of the core of 
judicial independence comports with persuasive normative accounts of judicial 
independence,27 is consistent with the Supreme Court’s prohibition on the revi-
sion or reopening of final judgments,28 and is rooted in the “Klein rule of deci-
sion” principle, named for a Reconstruction-era case that invalidated an attempt 
by Congress to direct the result in pending cases.29 After describing the con-
tours of the core of judicial independence, I will then argue that this core is 
vanishing. The modern Supreme Court has narrowed it through a series of doc-
trinal limitations on its scope, culminating in its Bank Markazi opinion. 
In Part II, I will unpack the potential implications of the Court’s Patchak 
case on the vanishing core of judicial independence. Patchak’s fractured opin-
ions raise more questions than they answer about the vitality and scope of the 
rule of decision principle. I will explore whether Patchak reflects the last gasp 
of air for judicial independence or whether, instead, Patchak breathes new life 
into its core. Patchak, although it should have been an easy case after Bank 
Markazi, unsettles the issues that Bank Markazi seemingly laid to rest. The 
Patchak opinions assert, in stark terms, diametrically opposed visions of the 
rule of decision principle and judicial independence more generally. 
In Part III, I will address the issues that Patchak tees up, but does not settle, 
about the scope of the Klein rule of decision principle and, along with it, the 
core of judicial independence. After exploring the dispute underlying each of 
these issues, I will suggest how the courts, including the Supreme Court, should 
 
25  Geyh, supra note 7, at 160 (arguing that judicial independence “is diminished by Con-
gress’s powers to establish, and by negative implication, disestablish the lower courts, and to 
curb the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction”). 
26  For thorough discussions of the structural relationships and practices that make up judicial 
independence, see Jackson, supra note 10, at 992 (describing the features that make up judi-
cial independence); John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining 
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 355 (1999) (same); Geyh & Van Tassel, su-
pra note 12, at 31–32 (same); ABA COMM’N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUD. INDEP., 
AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 10–11 (1997) [hereinafter ABA COMM’N]. 
27  Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 366–67 (arguing that judicial independence protects the “rule 
of law,” that is, “making sure that powerful people—particularly elected officials—cannot 
manipulate legal proceedings to their advantage”). 
28  Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411–12 (1792) (holding that “revision and control” 
of federal court judgments by the executive is inconsistent with judicial independence); Plaut 
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 514 U.S. 211, 225–26 (1995) (holding that Congress may not re-
quire the federal courts to reopen final judgments). 
29  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (holding unconstitutional a 
withdrawal of jurisdiction “founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes 
pending, prescribed by Congress”). 
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approach them in a future case. There are no easy answers to the issues raised 
in Patchak, but their proper resolution can preserve the core of judicial inde-
pendence while still recognizing Congress’s lawmaking role. 
I. THE VANISHING CORE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Judicial independence is easy to praise and difficult to define. It is clear 
that no impermeable barrier stands between judges and outside influence; yet, 
there is no agreement about whether there are, or should be, any limits to Con-
gress’s ability to control the federal courts. In this Part, I argue that the core of 
judicial independence is the power of the courts to decide cases that are pend-
ing before them without legislative direction. But, this core of judicial inde-
pendence is vanishing. The Supreme Court has blurred, if not erased, the line 
separating the judicial and legislative functions. Through a series of decisions 
upholding statutes that intrude on the power of the courts to decide pending 
cases, the Supreme Court has all but ceded the core function of the courts to 
Congress. 
A. The Core of Judicial Independence 
Rather than turning on a single necessary and sufficient feature, judicial in-
dependence is better characterized as the product of structures and practices 
that describe both judicial behavior and the larger governmental system in 
which it resides. As a result, before articulating the core of judicial independ-
ence, I begin with a description of its attributes. 
1. Attributes of Judicial Independence 
Judicial independence is often celebrated as the “backbone of our uniquely 
American liberties”30 or even essential to a free society.31 And it is no wonder; 
an independent judiciary is believed to protect any number of widely held val-
ues. These values are often stated in negative terms—that is—they free judges 
from certain unacceptable influences. If judges are financially independent of 
the parties whose cases they adjudicate, for example, they can resolve disputes 
free of bias caused by self-interest or fear of reprisal.32 Moreover, a judge 
 
30  Joseph M. Hood, Judicial Independence, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 137, 144–
45 (2003). 
31  ABA COMM’N, supra note 26, at iii (“Over two hundred years of experience confirm the 
wisdom of our nation’s founders that judicial independence is the ‘most essential characteris-
tic of a free society.’ ”). 
32  Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 355 (“[J]udicial independence is the idea that a judge ought to 
be free to decide the case before her without fear or anticipation of (illegitimate) punish-
ments or rewards.”); Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 31 (“[Judicial] independence 
concerns the impartiality of judges—the capacity of individual judges to decide specific cas-
es on the merits, without ‘fear or favor.’ ”); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 965 (argu-
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whose position and salary are not dependent on any particular case’s outcome 
can render decisions free from political pressure, whether from elected officials 
directly33 or from interest groups.34 Stated in positive rather than negative 
terms, independent judges are free to interpret the law and decide cases accord-
ing to the substantive legal commitments embodied in the rules they apply.35 
Despite these laudable justifications for an independent judiciary, judicial 
independence is not absolute. As scholars have often described, the robustness 
of judicial independence turns on whether it refers to the decisional independ-
ence of individual judges or the institutional independence of the judicial 
branch as a whole.36 A judge has decisional independence to the extent she is 
“free to decide the case before her without fear or anticipation of (illegitimate) 
punishments or rewards.”37 It is decisional independence that Chief Justice 
Roberts invokes when he stresses that judges are merely calling balls and 
strikes.38 And it is decisional independence that is questioned when judges are 
accused of ruling in line with political biases rather than impartially, on the 
facts and law before them.39 
 
ing that judicial independence includes freedom from “any outside pressure: personal, eco-
nomic, or political, including any fear of reprisal”). 
33  Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 31–32 (arguing that judicial independence protects 
the “capacity of the judiciary to remain autonomous, so that it might serve as an effective 
check against the excesses of the political branches”). 
34  Burbank, supra note 6, at 329 (arguing that judicial independence plays a role in “protect-
ing us from the day-to-day depredations of interest-group politics”); Jackson, supra note 10, 
at 969 (noting that judicial independence was intended, in part, to “protect minorities from 
popular passions that would violate their legal rights”). 
35  Jackson, supra note 10, at 969 (arguing that judges were made independent, in part, “to 
judge according to law; they were to have the independence to interpret the law in order to 
render judgment”); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 967 (arguing that interference 
from political actors “threatens to undermine the substantive commitments embodied in law 
through partial applications”). 
36  Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 355(“Independence seems to have at least two meanings. One 
meaning . . . is that a person is independent if she is able to take actions without fear of inter-
ference by another. . . . Another meaning . . . applies naturally to courts and to the judicial 
system as a whole.”); Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 31 (“Decisional independence 
concerns the impartiality of judges . . . . Branch or institutional independence, on the other 
hand, concerns the general, non-case specific separation of the judicial branch . . . .”). 
37  Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 355; see also Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 965 (de-
fining decisional independence as “judges’ ability to adjudicate facts and interpret law in 
particular cases ‘free from any outside pressure: personal, economic, or political, including 
any fear of reprisal’”). 
38  John Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1 (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires 
don’t make the rules, they apply them. . . . [A]nd I will remember that it’s my job to call 
balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”); Geyh, supra note 7, at 162 (“If we want judges to 
‘call ‘em like they see ‘em’—to decide cases on the basis of facts as they find them and law 
as they construe it to be written—then we must insulate them from external influences that 
could corrupt their integrity or impartiality.”). Cf. Michaels, supra note 9, at 411, 413. 
39  See Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial 
Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 858 (2008) (“Po-
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The decisional independence of individual judges is supported by the Con-
stitution’s salary and tenure protections as well as unwritten cultural norms.40 
Once confirmed, Article III of the Constitution provides tenure during “good 
behavior” and compensation that cannot be diminished.41 These tenure and sal-
ary protections are designed to permit judges to make decisions without fear of 
retaliation from the political branches.42 Although tenure is qualified by the 
possibility of removal after impeachment and conviction,43 this power is sel-
dom used.44 Indeed, of the thousands of Article III judges who have served 
since the beginning of the Republic, only fifteen have been impeached and, of 
those, only seven have been removed from office.45 
Compared with the decisional independence of individual judges, the insti-
tutional independence of the judiciary is far less secure. The judiciary is inde-
pendent in the institutional sense to the extent that it has authority that cannot 
be invaded by the political branches.46 But, because Congress is in control of 
 
litical bias refers to partisan or ideological bias: the desire for an outcome to the left (or 
right) of a (stipulated) impartial outcome.”); Jackson, supra note 10, at 967 (“[A]ll who act 
as judges are expected to exercise independent judgment, in the sense of being impartial as 
between the parties and not having a personal stake in the dispute . . . .”). 
40  Grove, supra note 22, at 467–68 (arguing that political actors treat many court-curbing 
measures as out of bounds although this restraint is not compelled by constitutional text, 
structure, or history). 
41  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); see 
Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 355 (noting that judges are more or less independent while the 
judiciary as an institution is more or less dependent on the political branches). 
42  Jackson, supra note 10, at 967 (noting that tenure and salary protections protect judges 
from consequences of unpopular decisions). 
43  Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole 
Power of Impeachment.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate shall have the sole Pow-
er to try all Impeachments.”). 
44  See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 148–50 (2017) (describing impeachment 
as a seldom used but important congressional power); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 
980 (“Over the course of American history only thirteen [now fifteen] judges have been im-
peached and only seven removed from office; four were acquitted and two more resigned 
before their trials in the Senate.”). 
45  Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/ 
impeachments-federal-judges [https://perma.cc/88S6-M5QY] (listing each impeachment and 
conviction of a federal judge). Because the House and Senate could, but do not, use the im-
peachment and conviction process more aggressively, their forbearance can be seen as part 
of the customary independence of the judiciary. See Geyh, supra note 7, at 158 (noting the 
“gradual decline over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the acceptability of holding 
the judiciary accountable for its decisions by means of impeachment . . . .”). Professor Grove 
has pointed out that some judges might resign rather than face the impeachment process. 
46  Burbank, supra note 6, at 320 (arguing that the standard view of judicial independence 
assures that “judges free of congressional and executive control will be in a position to de-
termine whether the assertion of power against the citizen is consistent with law”); Geyh & 
Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 32 (proposing that judicial review requires that “the courts 
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the budget, jurisdiction, and structure of the federal courts, the judiciary as a 
branch is better described as largely dependent on Congress rather than inde-
pendent of it.47 Although the Constitution, not Congress, creates the Supreme 
Court,48 it is Congress that decides whether to create lower federal courts, how 
to arrange them, how many judges will be appointed to them, and whether to 
abolish them.49 Congress also has the power to grant jurisdiction to50 and with-
draw jurisdiction from,51 lower federal courts.52 Moreover, although judges 
have the power to issue final judgments, they must rely on the executive for en-
forcement.53 
 
possess the means to protect their institutional integrity against unconstitutional political 
branch encroachments”). 
47  Geyh, supra note 7, at 163 (“The judiciary’s institutional independence is, therefore, more 
closely circumscribed by accountability-promoting mechanisms for congressional control of 
the judiciary’s budget, structure, administration and jurisdiction.”). 
48  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”). 
49  Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 359 (“The Constitution gives Congress the authority to create 
(or not create) federal courts other than the Supreme Court, to create and regulate their juris-
dictions, to decide how many federal judges there will be . . . .”). Congress famously used its 
power over the structure and existence of the courts to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801, in-
cluding eliminating judgeships. Jackson, supra note 10, at 991 (“Yet after the Jeffersonians’ 
ascent to power, in 1802 Congress enacted a statute to repeal legislation from the closing 
days of the Adams Administration that had created several new judgeships (filled with Fed-
eralist appointees); it thus effectively abolished Article III judgeships.”). 
50  Jackson, supra note 10, at 992 (“[Congress] has broad powers to control the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts . . . .”); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 986 (“[E]ven the most 
aggressive readings of Article III recognize that Congress has wide latitude to regulate the 
business of the federal courts.”). 
51  Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 988 (“Congress routinely dispossesses federal 
courts of authority to hear cases or award remedies because of concern for how the judges 
might rule, or in order to circumscribe their ability to interfere with congressional objec-
tives.”). Moreover, in limited circumstances, Congress can also cut the courts out of the de-
cision to imprison by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 9 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
52  Whether Congress can withdraw jurisdiction without limit is another question, and one 
that is the subject of this Article. See Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 
2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 29 (2019) (“[T]he Court – 
a coordinate branch of the national government – will excise subject-matter limitations on its 
appellate jurisdiction when a substantial, undefended purpose of such jurisdiction-stripping 
legislation is to limit the Court’s ability to consider a properly preserved constitutional 
claim.”). Cf. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (holding that the Court 
will not look for Congress’s motivation when it withdraws jurisdiction). 
53  BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 285 (2016) (noting that federal courts 
generally must turn to executive agencies or the President to enforce judgments); see also 
Burbank, supra note 6, at 323–24 (noting that the President has only rarely refused to exe-
cute federal court judgments). 
21 NEV. L.J. 531 
542 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:2 
 
While Congress may not diminish the salaries of sitting federal judges, it 
can increase their workload by failing to appoint new judges to overloaded 
courts54 and by cutting funding for court clerks, court security, and information 
technology.55 Conversely, Congress can reduce the influence of Article III 
courts by creating other institutions with the power to interpret federal law, like 
administrative agencies and legislative courts, and vesting them with authority 
to resolve vast numbers of legal disputes that otherwise would fall to Article III 
courts.56 
Perhaps most fundamentally, federal courts are dependent on Congress for 
providing them the law to apply.57 Courts are constrained not only by substan-
 
54  ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. JUST., THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES ON FEDERAL 
TRIAL COURTS, 1–2 (2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Im 
pact%20of%20Judicial%20Vacancies%20072114.pdf [https://perma.cc/X36K-AAHG] (ar-
guing that sustained vacancies in federal trial courts leads to judicial burn-out, delays, less 
time spent on each case, and increased administrative burdens). 
55  Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 985 (“Judges must worry about funds to keep this 
machine running and, especially, to hire capable staff and supply them with adequate re-
sources (which include computer and research support, courthouse security, storage facili-
ties, press offices, and much more).”); see also JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2013 YEAR-END REPORT 
ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5–6, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2013ye 
ar-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3MQ-8LWC] (noting that sequestration of funds had a 
deleterious effect on the administration of the federal courts, including leading to fewer pub-
lic defenders, decreasing court security, and delaying trials). 
56  Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 989 (“[F]ederal lawmakers have constituted a varie-
ty of non-Article III tribunals—so-called legislative or Article I courts—to adjudicate federal 
claims and interpret and apply federal law.”). For example, the United States Court of Feder-
al Claims, a legislative court, shares jurisdiction with the district courts over suits for money 
against the government. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)–(b). Bankruptcy Courts, also legislative courts, 
hear suits that otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of district courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 1334 
(the former creating bankruptcy courts within district courts and the latter granting jurisdic-
tion to district courts). 
57  See PFANDER, supra note 18, at 405 (noting that applying rules of decision is precisely 
what courts do). 
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tive law,58 but also the evidentiary59 and procedural60 rules that Congress 
writes.61 
Considering the differences between decisional independence and institu-
tional independence, scholars largely have concluded that judicial independ-
ence means something very different in the context of individual judges than it 
does for the judiciary as an institution. As Professors Ferejohn and Kramer put 
it, the federal system “protects individual judges from direct outside interfer-
ence while making the institution in which they work vulnerable to control by 
the political branches of government.”62 
Although the dichotomy between decisional and institutional independence 
is a useful heuristic, the line separating these concepts “often blurs in applica-
tion,” as Professor Geyh has noted.63 In this view, incursions on the courts’ in-
stitutional independence can have ripple effects on the decisional independence 
of individual judges. For example, if Congress threatens to withdraw jurisdic-
tion from the federal courts over a politically sensitive subject matter, then in-
dividual judges may be inclined, in a particular case, to reach a conclusion that 
protects the judiciary as an institution. Indeed, research suggests that the Su-
preme Court does voluntarily diminish its own power in response to threats of 
“Court-curbing” legislation, that is, “legislative attempts to limit or remove the 
Supreme Court’s power.”64 
 
58  Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1049 (2007) (“[T]he job of 
the courts is to vindicate the statutory scheme enacted by the legislature.”); Zoldan, Klein, 
supra note 20, at 2150 (“As a number of scholars have recognized, writing rules of decision 
for courts to follow—that is, writing the substantive law—is precisely what a legislature 
does.”). 
59  Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2150 (“Congress can, and does, write rules of evidence, 
defining what is relevant, what is admissible and inadmissible, and who is competent to give 
testimony.”); see also Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (establishing and en-
acting the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
60  E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (authorizing federal courts to issue writs); 28 U.S.C. § 1696 
(providing for service of process in foreign and international litigation); 28 U.S.C. § 1713 
(providing rules for class actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (establishing standards for jury selec-
tion); 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (setting out district court filing fees). 
61  Although Congress does create evidentiary and procedural rules itself, it also can, and 
does, delegate authority to the courts to write them. 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
62  Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 964; see also Geyh, supra note 7, at 163 (“The net 
effect . . . is a system of (more or less) independent judges, superimposed on a (more or less) 
dependent judiciary.”). On the historical origins of the distinction between decisional and 
institutional independence, see Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial In-
dependence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061, 1063 (2007) (“Securing the independence of individual 
judges, however, did not mean that the judiciary had become a separate department of gov-
ernment.”). 
63  Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Independence as an Organizing Principle, 10 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 185, 192 (2014). 
64  CLARK, supra note 21, at 25. 
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2. The Core of Judicial Independence 
Considering the imperfect way that the judiciary is protected from political 
influence, some scholars have concluded that the independence of the judiciary 
is more mythical than real.65 Nevertheless, there is also a long scholarly tradi-
tion of searching for the core of judicial independence—that is—some function 
of the judiciary that the political branches may not lawfully invade.66 After de-
scribing the parameters of the debate, I offer and defend a vision of the core of 
judicial independence. 
a. Competing Visions of the Core of Judicial Independence 
Professor Burbank argues that “the core of federal judicial independence is 
freedom of judicial decisions from control by the executive or legislative 
branches.”67 While acknowledging that “control” is an indeterminate concept, 
Burbank notes that the range of debate over the core of judicial independence is 
quite narrow.68 As he notes, it is widely accepted that Congress lacks the power 
to reopen final judgments.69 Moreover, it is also widely accepted that Congress 
has the power to change the law prospectively.70 As a result, he argues, the de-
bate over the core of the judiciary’s independence should be limited to “(1) the 
judicial power to interpret and implement the Constitution, and (2) the irreduci-
ble powers of federal courts to act as such.”71 
Much of the current debate over the core of judicial independence takes 
place in the range that Burbank sets out, focusing on the scope of Congress’s 
power to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts under the Constitution’s 
 
65  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political 
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 700, 702–03 (1995) (arguing that judicial independ-
ence is limited to good behavior and compensation clauses). 
66  See, e.g., Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 86 (“The Framers neither considered nor 
guarded against other, more speculative political branch encroachments upon the judiciary’s 
institutional autonomy . . . .”). For an assessment of the relationship between de jure and de 
facto judicial independence, see James Melton & Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial In-
dependence Really Matter?, J.L. & CTS., Fall 2014, at 187, 190 (“Judicial independence is a 
complex and contested concept, but at its core, it involves the ability and willingness of 
courts to decide cases in light of the law without undue regard to the views of other govern-
ment actors.”). 
67  Burbank, supra note 6, at 331. 
68  Id. at 335. 
69  Id. at 325 (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), for the proposi-
tion that Congress cannot reopen final judgments). 
70  Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“A legislature . . . may prescribe a new rule for future cases.”)); see also Zoldan, 
Klein, supra note 20, at 2150 (“[W]riting rules of decision for courts to follow—that is, writ-
ing the substantive law—is precisely what a legislature does.”). 
71  Burbank, supra note 6, at 325–26. 
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Exceptions Clause.72 Ex Parte McCardle73 can be taken to stand for the propo-
sition that Congress’s Exceptions Clause power is nearly unlimited, even if the 
result is to direct a federal court to reach a particular conclusion in a pending 
case.74 However, Professor Monaghan reads the Exceptions Clause more nar-
rowly, arguing that Congress may run afoul of Article III by withdrawing fed-
eral court jurisdiction for the purpose of defeating judicial review of constitu-
tional claims. He predicts that “the Court—a coordinate branch of the national 
government—will excise subject-matter limitations on its appellate jurisdiction 
when a substantial, undefended purpose of such jurisdiction-stripping legisla-
tion is to limit the Court’s ability to consider a properly preserved constitutional 
claim.”75 Importantly, Monaghan stops short of extending this prediction to 
statutory claims. Instead, he suggests that Congress might be justified in up-
holding a statute that strips jurisdiction when no constitutional rights are at 
stake.76 
Other scholars have read the Exceptions Clause either more broadly or 
more narrowly than Monaghan. Some have argued that Congress may not enact 
a statute that tells the federal courts how to rule in a particular case, even in the 
context of purely statutory claims.77 By contrast, a number of scholars view 
Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause more broadly. Professor Sprig-
man argues that Congress may strip jurisdiction from the federal courts even 
over claims asserting violations of the Constitution.78 In this way, Sprigman 
concludes, Congress may “displace a judicial interpretation of the Constitu-
tion’s meaning with its own.”79 Professor Grove makes the related point that, 
unlike some incursions on judicial independence, there is not a broad political 
 
72  Krotoszynski & DeProspo, supra note 22 (arguing for a broad rendering of a principle 
that prevents Congress from directing federal courts to reach particular judgments in pending 
cases); Evan H. Caminker, Schiavo and Klein, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 542–43 (2005) 
(arguing that Congress has the constitutional power to direct a federal court decision provid-
ed that it is framed in a particular way); see also Howard M. Wasserman, The Irrepressible 
Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 53–56 (2010). 
73  Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (holding that the Court will not 
consider Congress’s motivation when it withdraws jurisdiction). 
74  Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2159 n.159 (describing the tension between McCardle 
and a principle that Congress may not direct a federal court to reach a particular decision in a 
pending case). 
75  Monaghan, supra note 52, at 29. 
76  Id. at 67 (noting that jurisdiction stripping in the statutory context presents different issues 
than in the constitutional context and “[p]erhaps . . . should be upheld”). 
77  E.g., Krotoszynski & DeProspo, supra note 22 (arguing for a broad rendering of a princi-
ple that prevents Congress from directing federal courts to reach particular judgments in 
pending cases). 
78  Sprigman, supra note 22 (arguing for broad congressional power under the Exceptions 
Clause). 
79  Id. 
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consensus against jurisdiction-stripping.80 She concludes that attempts by the 
political branches to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction, even over constitu-
tional questions, may be met with little popular resistance, even if the political 
process presents additional barriers.81 
b. A Proposed Core of Judicial Independence 
I propose that the core of judicial independence is the authority of the fed-
eral courts to adjudicate specific legal disputes that have been presented to 
them free from legislative direction. In this proposal, Congress has broad au-
thority to set policy by writing rules of decision for courts to follow. However, 
the court should not apply a change in law to a pending case when Congress 
has failed to address a governmental objective other than merely resolving 
pending cases.82 Moreover, the courts must apply a generally applicable law, 
but not a law that creates special exemptions for a closed class of identifiable 
individuals.83 In addition, Congress may withdraw jurisdiction over a class of 
cases, even if some of those cases are pending. But, the court should not give 
effect to a withdrawal of jurisdiction if the only result is the termination of 
pending cases.84 Finally, Congress has wide latitude to assert the government’s 
sovereign immunity. However, a court should not recognize an assertion of 
sovereign immunity that is better characterized as governmental self-dealing.85 
My proposed formulation is largely within the range of debate over the 
core of judicial independence articulated by Professor Burbank. In a sense, my 
formulation can be considered a gloss on Burbank’s proposition that the federal 
courts must have the irreducible power to act as federal courts. My formulation 
complements the proposal offered by Professor Monaghan; but, it is perhaps 
more protective of judicial independence because it suggests a limitation on 
Congress’s power over the jurisdiction of the courts in both statutory and con-
 
80  Grove, supra note 22, at 471, 518 (noting that there is no bipartisan norm that jurisdiction-
stripping is “off the wall”). 
81  Id. at 523 (noting that modern attempts at jurisdiction stripping have been unsuccessful); 
see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 869, 870–74, 886 (2011) (describing how political actors have used normal legislative 
processes to block jurisdiction-stripping measures). A number of scholars have argued for a 
narrow, but more definite, core of judicial independence centered around the court’s practic-
es and procedures. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1322 (1993) (“[T]he the-
ory of inherent court power nonetheless requires that congressional involvement in 
rulemaking acknowledge the ‘significance of a certain degree of judicial autonomy’ over 
internal court rules of practice and procedure.”); Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? 
Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 972–73 (1996) (“[T]here is a core of 
control vested in the Supreme Court that is beyond the constitutional reach of Congress.”). 
82  See infra Section III.A. 
83  See infra Section III.B. 
84  See infra Section III.C. 
85  See infra Section III.D. 
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stitutional cases. Moreover, my proposal, unlike Monaghan’s, does not turn on 
finding an illicit motive on the part of Congress. Similarly, my conception of 
the core of judicial independence is more protective of the judiciary than the 
vision advanced by Professor Sprigman. Sprigman does not distinguish be-
tween Congress’s power over general policy matters and matters affecting iden-
tifiable individuals; in my view, by contrast, Congress should have less leeway 
to legislate for an identifiable individual than it does for a class of indetermi-
nate membership.86 As described below, there are normative, structural, and 
doctrinal justifications for preserving the core of judicial independence as I 
have described it. 
First, allowing the courts to adjudicate specific legal disputes that have 
been presented to them without legislative direction vindicates persuasive nor-
mative views about the goals of an independent judiciary. Elaborating on the 
values protected by judicial independence, Professor Ferejohn argues that it 
protects the “rule of law,” by which he means “making sure that powerful peo-
ple—particularly elected officials—cannot manipulate legal proceedings to 
their advantage.”87 In addition, without judicial independence, he argues, gov-
ernment officials “may interfere in the enforcement of statutes enacted by pre-
vious legislatures without bothering to go through procedural formalities.”88 
Preserving the core of judicial independence as I describe it—that is, the 
courts’ ability to actually decide cases pending before them—protects the val-
ues identified by Professor Ferejohn. If courts retain the power to decide cases 
pending before them, then they can ignore elected officials’ attempts to manip-
ulate legal proceedings to reach a result that favors them in a particular pending 
case. Moreover, if courts have the power to decide pending cases, then they can 
prevent Congress from effectively changing the substantive law in particular 
cases in the guise of altering jurisdictional rules. 
The values that Professor Ferejohn describes are similar to an argument in 
The Dialogue, Professor Henry Hart’s foundational essay on federal court ju-
risdiction.89 In The Dialogue, one of Hart’s speakers argues that Article III can 
be read to create a space for a federal court not just to declare one party to a 
case the winner, but actually, acting like a court, to decide the case. In his 
words, “if Congress directs an Article III court to decide a case, I can easily 
read into Article III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the court how 
to decide it.”90 Protecting the core of judicial independence, as I define it, sup-
ports the value identified in Hart’s Dialogue. Preventing Congress from direct-
ing a court to pick the winner and loser in a particular pending case preserves 
 
86  See infra Sections III.A–B. 
87  Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 366. 
88  Id. at 367. 
89  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372–73 (1953). 
90  Id. at 1373. 
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the court’s ability to act like a court, including its power to make factual find-
ings and draw legal conclusions that bear on the outcome of the case.91 Moreo-
ver, insulating a court’s ability to adjudicate particular, pending cases allows 
the court to proceed according to known procedural rules, a valued characteris-
tic of courts.92 Conversely, if Congress could interfere in a pending case to di-
rect the court to declare one litigant a winner, the court’s normal procedural 
rules, findings of fact, and legal conclusions are all made irrelevant to the 
judgment it renders. 
Framed another way, the courts’ ability to decide cases pending before 
them can be considered the core of judicial independence because it protects 
values associated with both institutional and decisional independence.93 Pre-
serving the case-adjudicating function of the courts protects the judiciary’s in-
stitutional independence by placing a limit on Congress’s otherwise unlimited 
power to arrange federal court jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause. Allow-
ing courts to disregard some congressional limits on their jurisdiction in pend-
ing cases secures for them a measure of freedom from political interference.94 
Perhaps less obviously, preventing Congress from directing the result in 
pending cases also protects the decisional independence of individual judges. 
When Congress threatens to withdraw jurisdiction from the courts in a way that 
would terminate pending cases, the judges considering those cases are made 
acutely aware of the political salience of their pending decisions. It is likely that 
a judge who knows a case on her docket has been targeted by Congress will 
feel pressure to rule in a way that comports with the threatened jurisdictional 
tinkering. This kind of outside political pressure, whether effective or not in 
any given case, compromises the value of decisional independence, which re-
quires freedom from “outside pressure: personal, economic, or political.”95 
Second, preserving the courts’ ability to decide cases pending before them 
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s treatment of the political branches’ at-
 
91  Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 563 
(2007) (“[T]he sort of finality that is typically associated with judicial decisions” includes 
the powers “to make factual findings that courts are bound to accept in subsequent litigation, 
or to resolve legal disputes.”). 
92  See Mullenix, supra note 81, at 1322 (“[T]he theory of inherent court power nonetheless 
requires that congressional involvement in rulemaking acknowledge the ‘significance of a 
certain degree of judicial autonomy’ over internal court rules of practice and procedure.”). 
93  Geyh, supra note 63, at 185, 192 (noting the potential overlap between institutional and 
decisional independence). A special thanks to Charles Geyh and Henry Monaghan for sug-
gesting this line of inquiry. 
94  Burbank, supra note 6, at 320 (arguing that the standard view of judicial independence 
assures that “judges free of congressional and executive control will be in a position to de-
termine whether the assertion of power against the citizen is consistent with law”). 
95  Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 965 (defining decisional independence as “judges’ 
ability to adjudicate facts and interpret law in particular cases ‘free from any outside pres-
sure: personal, economic, or political, including any fear of reprisal’ ”); see also Ferejohn, 
supra note 26, at 355. 
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tempts to control judicial outcomes after judgment. Hayburn’s Case has long 
stood for the proposition that a statute may not constitutionally vest authority in 
the judiciary to enter judgment if that judgment can later be revised by execu-
tive action.96 Analogously, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, the Court clarified that 
Congress may not direct a federal court to reopen judgments that have already 
been finalized.97 
A parallel can be drawn between the Court’s prohibition on political inter-
ference with final judgments and my proposal for a prohibition on legislative 
direction of judicial outcomes before judgment.98 Whether before or after 
judgment, political interference can deprive the court of its power to actually 
decide a case, as Hart explained.99 In both circumstances, the judicial process is 
mooted by political considerations and the court’s law-application process is 
disconnected from the result: in short, political interference, whether before or 
after judgment, makes the court all-but-superfluous to a case’s outcome. 
Indeed, in one respect, the comparison between pre- and post-judgment po-
litical interference suggests that the Court should be more suspicious of pre-
judgment interference. When the executive revises, or Congress reopens, a fed-
eral court judgment, at least it is clear that the court’s judgment and the politi-
cal reaction to it are two different events. From a political accountability per-
spective, then, the public could reward or punish political actors for whatever 
position they took on the court’s underlying decision. By contrast, when Con-
gress directs courts to enter judgment for one of the parties in a pending case, 
the public cannot know how the case would have come out in the absence of 
the political interference. As a result, the electorate cannot know whether the 
result is purely a function of a political act, or instead, whether the court would 
have reached the same result in the absence of political interference.100 
 
96  Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (holding that “revision and control” of 
federal court judgments by the executive is inconsistent with judicial independence). More 
clearly, the Court has held that constitutional courts may “render no judgments not binding 
and conclusive on the parties and none that are subject to later review or alteration by admin-
istrative action.” Chi. & S. Airline v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1948). 
97  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (holding that Congress may not 
require the federal courts to reopen final judgments). Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 
346–47 (2000) (upholding a statute that revised final judgments, temporarily, for the purpose 
of facilitating other changes that were the main purpose of the law). 
98  Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and Pro-
cesses: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1243–44 (1981) (arguing 
that Klein represents an extension of the principle against nonjudicial revision of court 
judgments). 
99  See Hart, supra note 89 at 1373 (“[I]f Congress directs an Article III court to decide a 
case, I can easily read into Article III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the court 
how to decide it.”). 
100  See Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of 
Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. 
Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 438–40 (2006) (arguing that Klein can be read to require the 
judiciary to prevent Congress from deceiving the electorate). I do not make the broader 
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Third, formulating the core of judicial independence as the power of courts 
to actually decide cases pending before them without legislative direction gives 
modern meaning to the Reconstruction-era case of United States v. Klein, the 
Supreme Court’s first—and as it turns out its last—strong statement defending 
a court’s power to actually decide pending cases.101 In Klein, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a statute that withdrew jurisdiction from the federal courts in 
a group of pending cases, holding that it violated the principle of separation of 
powers. Specifically, the Court held that Congress unconstitutionally en-
croached on the judicial power because its withdrawal of jurisdiction was 
“founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, pre-
scribed by Congress.”102 
The Klein “rule of decision” principle, as this curious statement is called, 
has intrigued scholars for generations,103 but there has been little agreement 
about exactly what, if anything, Klein prohibits.104 Despite disagreement about 
its contours,105 Klein is the strongest doctrinal source for my definition of the 
 
claim that the public actually would tend to be aware of decisions of the courts or the politi-
cal branches. 
101  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (invalidating statute that with-
drew jurisdiction “founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, 
prescribed by Congress”). 
102  Id. at 146–47. 
103  Some scholars have searched for a principle that is largely consistent with not only Klein 
but also other rule of decision principle cases. Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2194–208 
(arguing that Klein reflects a principle against government self-dealing); Young, supra note 
98, at 1244 (arguing that Klein represents an extension of the principle against nonjudicial 
revision of court judgments). Others suggest that Klein is a reminder of important but unen-
forceable constitutional values. Caminker, supra note 72, at 542-43 (arguing that Klein is a 
rule of “drafting etiquette” that does not actually prevent Congress from directing a decision, 
only phrasing its direction in a particular way); see also Wasserman, supra note 72, at 85 
(“Klein does no more than Marbury and dozens of cases in which the Court has struck down 
substantive federal statutory law as violating individual constitution rights.”). Still others 
suggest that Klein stands for no coherent principle about the line between the legislature and 
the judiciary and should be ignored. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and 
Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 380–81. 
104  Klein is so vexing because it seems both intuitively correct and literally false. On one 
hand, by preventing Congress from dictating a rule of decision in a pending case, Klein pre-
serves judicial independence by creating space for the courts actually to decide cases pend-
ing before them. On the other hand, Klein seems to conflict with longstanding precedent that 
requires courts to apply the law as Congress writes it, even if that means applying a newly 
enacted law to a case on appeal from a final judgment. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109–10 (1801) (“[When] subsequent to the judgment, and before the 
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which gov-
erns, the law must be obeyed . . . .”). 
105  There are many possible things wrong with the statute invalidated in Klein. These have 
been identified by other scholars and I have explained and questioned them in previous 
work. These include: the fact that Congress provided a rule of decision for the court to fol-
low, the specificity of the statute, the retroactivity of the statute, the political motivation un-
derlying the statute, the fact that the statute may have required the Court to reach an other-
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core of judicial independence because it suggests that, at least in some circum-
stances, Congress may not intercede in a pending federal case without violating 
the Constitution. As a result, the core of the institutional independence of the 
judiciary, as a doctrinal matter, rests on the viability of some formulation of 
Klein. In the rest of this Part, I describe the Klein case and explain how the 
modern Supreme Court has chipped away at its meaning, and along with it, the 
core of judicial independence. 
B. The Vanishing Core of Judicial Independence 
Because Klein’s holding resists easy generalization into a broader princi-
ple, recounting the unusual posture of the case helps clarify its possible reach. 
After describing Klein, I will demonstrate how its rule of decision principle, 
along with the core of judicial independence, has been eroded. 
1. Klein’s Rule of Decision Principle 
Klein arose out of a Civil War-era statute that permitted federal agents to 
seize and sell abandoned or captured civilian property confiscated in areas re-
belling against the United States.106 In order to facilitate the recovery of dam-
ages by loyal residents of rebellious areas, Congress permitted claimants to 
bring suit against the United States for the value of confiscated property so long 
as the claimant demonstrated that he had “never given any aid or comfort to the 
present rebellion.”107 In United States v. Padelford, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the compensation statute broadly, holding that even a person who had 
committed a disloyal act would be eligible to recover the value of his property 
so long as he later took an oath of loyalty pursuant to a presidential pardon.108 
In a scenario similar to Padelford, a man named Wilson, whose property 
was confiscated and sold by the Union, took an oath of loyalty.109 After Wil-
son’s death, Klein, the executor of his estate, relied on this oath and Padel-
ford’s broad reading of the compensation statute to prevail in a suit against the 
United States.110 While Klein’s case was pending on the government’s appeal, 
Congress passed an appropriations bill funding judgments rendered against the 
United States by the Court of Claims.111 The appropriations bill, however, also 
 
wise unconstitutional result, and the fact that it inured to the benefit of the government. 
Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2150. 
106  Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863, ch. 120, § 1, 12 Stat. 820, 820. 
107  Id. § 3. 
108  United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 543 (1869) (broadly interpreting the 
Abandoned and Captured Property Act). 
109  Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to Shape the 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 87, 91–92 (Vicki C. Jackson 
& Judith Resnik eds., 2010). 
110  Id. at 92–94. 
111  Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 1, 16 Stat. 230, 235. 
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contained a proviso that specifically disallowed proof of a loyalty oath to serve 
as the basis for recovering the value of confiscated property.112 Instead, the 
proviso made evidence that a person took a loyalty oath pursuant to a presiden-
tial pardon conclusive proof of disloyalty, directed the trial court to dismiss 
these claims, and withdrew jurisdiction from the Supreme Court over claims in 
which the claimant had previously prevailed based on evidence of a loyalty 
oath.113 
In Klein, the Supreme Court invalidated the proviso because its withdrawal 
of jurisdiction was “founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in 
causes pending, prescribed by Congress.”114 Because of the opacity of this lan-
guage, and the Court’s refusal to strike down any other statutes under Klein, the 
contours of the rule of decision principle have remained somewhat of a mys-
tery. Although the Court has not relied on the Klein rule of decision principle to 
invalidate any other statute, it has made offhanded references to the case a few 
times, suggesting the viability of some principle rooted in the case.115 In the ab-
sence of concrete Supreme Court guidance, theories about the health and scope 
of Klein have flourished. 
2. The Evisceration of Klein 
It was only in the modern era that the Court explicitly began to chip away 
at the rule of decision principle by slowly conforming it to the earlier case of 
Schooner Peggy.116 In Schooner Peggy, the Court upheld the application of a 
newly enacted law on appeal, even though the trial court correctly applied the 
old law at the trial stage. The Court held that, when “subsequent to the judg-
ment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and posi-
tively changes the rule which governs, the [new] law must be obeyed . . . .”117 
This requirement is often referred to as the “Changed Law Rule.”118 
Klein (which post-dates Schooner Peggy) can be read as an exception to 
the Changed Law Rule, preventing the application of new law to pending cases 
in certain circumstances. Read in this way, the Klein rule of decision principle 
and the Changed Law Rule can coexist, neither swallowing the other, so long 
 
112  Tyler, supra note 109, at 93–94. 
113  Id. at 94. 
114  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
115  United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 403–05 (1980) (mentioning 
Klein); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1944) (same). 
116  United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801). 
117  Id. at 110. 
118  PETER GERANGELOS, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE IN 
JUDICIAL PROCESS: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND LIMITATIONS 181–83 (2009) (referring 
to the Changed Law Rule); J. Richard Doidge, Note, Is Purely Retroactive Legislation Lim-
ited by the Separation of Powers?: Rethinking United States v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
910, 959–60 (1994) (same). 
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as the rule of decision principle is narrower than the Changed Law Rule. By 
many accounts, however, if the Changed Law Rule is an exception to Klein, the 
Changed Law Rule swallows Klein altogether.119 Professor Araiza expressed 
this view when describing the vitality of Klein: “if lawmaking is the power to 
create liability rules and the procedural structure for enforcing those rules, then 
overturning a statutory interpretation and amending the underlying statute both 
constitute lawmaking.”120 In this view, there is no space between “amending 
applicable law,” which is permissible under Schooner Peggy, and “prescribing 
a rule of decision in causes pending,” which is prohibited under Klein. 
The modern evisceration of the rule of decision principle resulted from the 
inversion of the relationship between Klein and Schooner Peggy, making the 
Changed Law Rule an exception to the rule of decision principle rather than the 
other way around. The evisceration proceeded in three stages: first as a sugges-
tion, next as dictum, and finally as a holding. 
a. Stage 1: The Suggestion 
In stage one, the Court suggested that Schooner Peggy’s Changed Law 
Rule was an exception to the rule of decision principle. The statute considered 
in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon modified and codified an agreement between 
the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the state of Oregon 
over logging rights and the conservation of spotted owls.121 In order to help en-
force the new policy, the statute, known as the Northwest Timber Compromise, 
provided that a group of lawsuits brought by logging and conservation groups 
would be dismissed so long as BLM abided by the terms of the Compromise.122 
The Court upheld the district court’s dismissal of the named, pending cases be-
cause the Compromise amended the statutory provisions that formed the basis 
for the pending suits.123 Although it did not squarely address the issue, the 
Court, for the first time, suggested that the Changed Law Rule was an excep-
tion to Klein, noting in passing that Congress may always amend or repeal ex-
isting law, even for the purpose of ending ongoing litigation.124 
 
119  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Say-
ing Congress ‘creates new law’ in one case but not another simply expresses a conclusion on 
that issue . . . .”); William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the 
Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1104–06 (1999). 
120  Araiza, supra note 119, at 1079. 
121  Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 432 (1992). 
122  Id. at 439–40 (recounting the circumstances surrounding the Northwest Timber Com-
promise). 
123  Id. at 441. 
124  Id. (“Because we conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) did amend applicable law, we need 
not consider whether this reading of Klein is correct.”). 
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b. Stage 2: The Dictum 
Stage two of the evisceration of the rule of decision principle was the 
Court’s assertion that the Changed Law Rule is an exception to it rather than 
the other way around. In Plaut, the Court invalidated legislation that reopened a 
class of final judgments.125 The Court did not rest on Klein, however, instead 
articulating a new separation-of-powers-based restriction on reopening final 
judgments.126 As for Klein, the Court asserted that the rule of decision principle 
did not apply because “its prohibition does not take hold when Congress 
amends applicable law.”127 Because the statute in Plaut changed the substantive 
legal standard for the judiciary to apply, the Court noted, it changed the law 
within the meaning of Klein, rendering Klein inapplicable.128 
c. Stage 3: The Holding 
Stage three of the evisceration of the rule of decision principle was the 
Court’s explicit reliance on the Changed Law Rule as an exception to the appli-
cation of Klein. In Bank Markazi v. Peterson,129 claimants brought suit against 
the country of Iran for damages arising from injuries and deaths caused by 
state-sponsored terrorist acts.130 Although claimants were awarded judgments 
amounting to billions of dollars, these judgments could not be satisfied by as-
sets located in the United States.131 The claimants filed actions, later consoli-
dated into single case, against Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran. Under 
generally applicable law, however, Bank Markazi, as a Central Bank, could not 
be reached to satisfy the existing default judgments against Iran.132 In response, 
Congress enacted a statute permitting claims against Iran to be satisfied by the 
assets of Bank Markazi. The statute explicitly named the pending case against 
Bank Markazi and provided that it applied to that case and none other.133 
Before the Supreme Court, Bank Markazi argued that the statute violated 
Klein’s rule of decision principle because it prescribed a rule that applied to a 
 
125  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995). 
126  Id. at 219 (“By retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, 
Congress has violated this fundamental principle [of separation of powers].”). 
127  Id. at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
128  Id. 
129  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). 
130  Id. at 1319 (setting out statutory framework at issue in Bank Markazi). 
131  Id. at 1317–18 (describing statutory barriers to execution of judgments). 
132  Id. at 1318 (describing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act shields property of a 
foreign central bank from execution). 
133  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-158, § 502, 126 
Stat. 1214, 1258–60 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 8772) (authorizing attachment of 
“financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran et al.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1). 
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single pending case, indeed, one identified in the statute itself.134 The Court re-
jected the argument, holding that the statute did not violate Klein. By permit-
ting claimants to reach assets of one entity to satisfy judgments owed by anoth-
er, Congress had amended applicable law, the Court reasoned, making Klein’s 
restrictions inapplicable.135 
After Bank Markazi, it appeared that the rule of decision principle had been 
swallowed whole by the Changed Law Rule. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in 
his Bank Markazi dissent, a Changed Law Rule exception to Klein is coexten-
sive with Klein itself: “[c]hanging the law is simply how Congress acts.”136 If 
this view is correct—if every statute “changes the law” within the meaning of 
Klein—then Klein never applies in the only circumstance in which it might ap-
ply, that is, when Congress writes new law for the court to apply to a pending 
case. 
Bank Markazi’s definitive restatement of the relationship between the 
Changed Law Rule and the rule of decision principle is more than a fine doctri-
nal point. It is a remarkable (re)statement of the relationship between the feder-
al courts and Congress. Although the branches have never been hermetically 
sealed from one another,137 Klein seemed to stand for the proposition that there 
was some core of judicial power that Congress could not (or at least would not) 
invade. The viability of Klein, therefore, is of the gravest consequence to the 
independence of the judiciary. Without a core power to decide cases pending 
before it, it is hard to articulate what is left of the judiciary’s independence 
from Congress. 
Bank Markazi’s summary treatment of the rule of decision principle 
seemed to spell the end of Klein and the independence of the judiciary. But just 
as the restraining power of Klein has long been exaggerated,138 its death may be 
exaggerated as well; the Court’s decision in Patchak v. Zinke139 has unsettled 
the issues that Bank Markazi seemed to have resolved. Patchak’s fractured 
opinions set out competing visions of Klein and raise the possibility that the 
rule of decision principle (including the core of judicial independence) has 
some life in it yet. Part II describes Patchak, a puzzling case that can be read 
either as the last gasp of breath for judicial independence or, instead, as the case 
that breathes new life into its core. 
 
134  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1323 (citing Klein for proposition that statutes that prescribe 
a rule of decision in pending cases are unconstitutional). 
135  Id. (“More recent decisions, however, have made it clear that Klein does not inhibit Con-
gress from amend[ing] applicable law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
136  Id. at 1335 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
137  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). 
138  Wasserman, supra note 72, at 55 (“[Klein] contains broad language and exaggerated rhe-
torical flourishes, with statements of principles that cannot literally be true and often are 
dead wrong.”). 
139  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 901 (2018). 
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II. PATCHAK: A LAST GASP OR NEW LIFE FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE? 
Patchak arose from a decision of the Department of the Interior to take into 
trust a tract of land known as the Bradley Property.140 Interior made this deci-
sion at the request of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi In-
dians, who desired land for building a casino.141 Patchak, who lived near the 
Bradley Property, challenged the legality of Interior’s action under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.142 While Patchak’s lawsuit was pending, Congress 
passed The Gun Lake Act,143 which identified and declared lawful the specific 
decision to take the Bradley Property into trust.144 Making clear Congress’s in-
tention to pick the winner in Patchak’s suit against Interior, the Gun Lake Act 
also required the federal courts to “promptly dismiss” claims relating to the 
Bradley Property.145 Specifically, it provides: 
NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (in-
cluding an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this 
Act) relating to the [Bradley Property] shall not be filed or maintained in a Fed-
eral court and shall be promptly dismissed.146 
Pursuant to this statute, the district court dismissed Patchak’s suit against Inte-
rior and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.147 
Before the Supreme Court, Patchak argued that the Gun Lake Act violated 
the Klein rule of decision principle by directing federal courts to dismiss a 
pending case without applying new law.148 But, following the broad definition 
of changing the law set out in Bank Markazi, Congress did make new law: the 
new law requires the court to dismiss cases relating to the Bradley Property.149 
After Bank Markazi, therefore, Patchak should have been an easy case. Never-
theless, no opinion garnered a majority of the Court, and the multiple concur-
rences and dissent highlight the fact that the Klein rule of decision principle, 
seemingly laid to rest in Bank Markazi, is still unsettled. In this Part, I describe 
the Patchak opinions and highlight the issues they raise. In Part III, I offer sug-
 
140  Id. at 902–03. For a good explanation of Patchak’s potential effect on Klein’s rule of de-
cision principle, see Monaghan, supra note 52, at 19–20 (noting that Thomas’s plurality 
opinion seems to have articulated new and broad justifications for jurisdiction stripping pro-
visions, despite Klein). 
141  Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 903. 
142  Id. (describing procedural posture). 
143  Id. at 904 (citing Gun Lake Act, Pub. L. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014) (requiring dis-
missal of Patchak’s claim against Interior)). 
144  Id. (affirming Interior’s decision to take the Bradley Property into trust). 
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. at 908–09 (describing and rejecting argument based on Klein’s rule of decision prin-
ciple). 
149  Id. at 908 (citing Bank Markazi for broad reading of Changed Law Rule). 
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gestions about how Patchak’s unsettled issues might be, and should be, re-
solved. 
A. The Plurality 
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion for a plurality of four, including Justices 
Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. After framing Patchak as an issue of separation of 
powers, Justice Thomas offered several independent reasons why the Gun Lake 
Act did not violate the Klein rule of decision principle.150 
First, adopting Bank Markazi’s broad definition of changing the law, Jus-
tice Thomas opined that Klein’s restrictions apply only when Congress directs 
the courts to reach a result under old law, but not when Congress “changes the 
law.”151 A jurisdiction-stripping statute like the Gun Lake Act, Thomas wrote, 
changes the law because it eliminates jurisdiction for cases relating to the Brad-
ley Property.152 Whatever Klein’s restrictions may be, therefore, they do not 
prevent Congress from withdrawing jurisdiction over cases relating to the Brad-
ley Property.153 
Second, Thomas distinguished Klein on the ground that the appropriations 
proviso disapproved in Klein was a “selective” jurisdiction-stripping statute.154 
By contrast, he opined, the Gun Lake Act stripped jurisdiction over “every suit 
relating to the Bradley Property,” which he characterized as a “class of cas-
es.”155 Because a statute that strips jurisdiction over a class of cases is a lawful 
exercise of Congress’s power to arrange the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
the Gun Lake Act, too, is lawful.156 
Third, Thomas addressed the fact that the Gun Lake Act seemed specially 
designed to reach a single pending case. Thomas expressed doubt that the con-
stitutional line separating the legislative from the judicial branches can be 
based either on Congress’s motives or the number of cases affected by the 
change in law.157 Moreover, Thomas asserted, as a factual matter, the statute 
did not address a single case.158 Because it required dismissal of cases “relating 
 
150  Id. at 905. 
151  Id. (interpreting the Changed Law Rule). 
152  Id. 
153  Id. (“Section 2(b) changes the law. Specifically, it strips federal courts of jurisdiction 
over actions ‘relating to’ the Bradley Property.”). 
154  Id. at 909 (“And unlike the selective jurisdiction-stripping statute in Klein, § 2(b) strips 
jurisdiction over every suit relating to the Bradley Property.”). 
155  Id. (emphasis added). 
156  Id. (concluding that the Gun Lake Act strips jurisdiction in a class of cases). 
157  Id. at 910 (“We doubt that the constitutional line separating the legislative and judicial 
powers turns on factors such as a court’s doubts about Congress’s unexpressed motives, [or] 
the number of ‘cases [that] were pending when the provision was enacted’ . . . .” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
158  Id. 
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to” the Bradley Property, it applied, at least in theory, to an open-ended class of 
cases.159 
B. Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s Concurrences 
In a concurring opinion for herself and Justice Sotomayor, Justice Gins-
burg steered clear of the separation of powers implications of Patchak, opining 
instead that it could be resolved as an issue of sovereign immunity.160 Because 
it withdrew jurisdiction from the federal courts to hear a suit against the United 
States, Ginsburg opined, the Gun Lake Act had the functional effect of assert-
ing the government’s sovereign immunity.161 And because the United States 
can always assert its immunity from suit, she concluded that the Gun Lake Act 
was valid even though it directed a federal court to dismiss a particular, pend-
ing suit.162 
Justice Sotomayor wrote a limited separate concurrence, emphasizing that, 
had the suit been one between private parties, she would have joined the dis-
sent, as she did in Bank Markazi.163 She concurred only because the United 
States was a party. In her view, the Gun Lake Act “restored” the sovereign im-
munity of the United States, noting, like Ginsburg, that the assertion of sover-
eign immunity moots any separation of powers concerns.164 
C. Breyer’s Concurrence 
Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence in which he opined that Con-
gress often “confirms” administrative action. Because Interior’s action to take 
 
159  Id. Thomas raised two other points. First, he opined that Klein didn’t actually prohibit 
Congress from directing the federal courts to reach a particular decision in pending cases. Id. 
at 909. Rather, Thomas interpreted Klein to mean only that Congress could not declare that 
pardons are not evidence of loyalty or strip the court of jurisdiction to reach the same result. 
Id. Contrary to this view, Klein rested on two separate grounds for its result: one, that by 
providing a rule of decision for the courts to follow, “Congress has inadvertently passed the 
limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power;” and two, and in the alternative, 
that by “impairing the effect of a pardon,” the proviso infringed on “the constitutional power 
of the Executive.” United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871). Second, 
Thomas also addressed the argument that Congress impermissibly interfered with the 
Court’s previous decision in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. 
Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012) (Patchak I), which held that Patchak’s case “may proceed.” 
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 903–04. He opined that Patchak’s suit was not final, so Plaut’s rule 
against reopening final judgments did not apply. See id. at 908. 
160  Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 912–13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
161  Id. at 913. 
162  Id. at 912–13 (“Just as it is Congress’ prerogative to consent to suit, so too is it within 
Congress’ authority to withdraw consent once given.”). 
163  Id. at 913 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 
1310, 1329–30 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
164  Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 914 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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the Bradley Property into trust was itself constitutional, Congress’s action con-
firming or ratifying this administration action was likewise constitutional.165 
D. Roberts’s Dissent 
Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissent joined by Justices Kennedy and 
Gorsuch. He would have held that Congress violates the principle of separation 
of powers when it “manipulates jurisdictional rules to decide the outcome of a 
particular pending case.”166 In a reprise of his dissenting opinion in Bank 
Markazi, Roberts recounted the history of the Confederation period. He empha-
sized the social and economic dislocations caused by early state legislatures’ 
usurpation of judicial functions.167 But, in Patchak, the Chief Justice drew a 
different conclusion than he did in his Bank Markazi dissent, and it was a con-
clusion with potentially far-reaching consequences: the Constitution prohibits 
the legislature from applying the law in a particular case.168 Drawing on the 
general principle that the legislature sets rules for society while the judiciary 
and executive apply those rules in individual cases, Roberts suggested that Ar-
ticle III limits the legislature’s power to decide individual cases.169 Roberts 
connected this principle with Klein, opining that Klein stands for the proposi-
tion that the legislature may not intervene in a particular pending case in a way 
that cuts out the role of the judiciary.170 
Roberts went on to respond to the plurality and concurring opinions. First, 
Roberts rejected Thomas’s argument that the Gun Lake Act withdrew jurisdic-
tion over a class of cases. Rather, he opined, the Gun Lake Act was intended to 
withdraw jurisdiction over a particular case, despite being framed in a general 
way.171 The specificity, opined Roberts, distinguishes the Gun Lake Act from 
the statute upheld in Bank Markazi, which resolved consolidated cases from 
more than one thousand claimants.172 
Second, Roberts countered Thomas’s argument that all Congress must do 
to “amend applicable law” within the meaning of Klein is enact a statute. Con-
trary to Thomas’s assertion that the Changed Law Rule is a wholesale excep-
tion to Klein, Roberts would have held that “the concept of ‘changing the law’ 
 
165  Id. at 911–12 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
166  Id. at 919–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
167  Id. at 914–15 (noting “disarray produced by this system of legislative equity” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
168  Id. at 915, 919–20 (“Congress exercises the judicial power when it manipulates jurisdic-
tional rules to decide the outcome of a particular pending case.”). 
169  Id. at 915. 
170  Id. at 915–916. 
171  Id. at 917. 
172  Id. at 918. 
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must imply some measure of generality or preservation of an adjudicative role 
for the courts.”173 
Third, the Chief Justice rejected Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s con-
clusion that the Gun Lake Act restored the government’s sovereign immuni-
ty.174 Roberts did not respond directly to the constitutional argument—whether 
Congress may assert sovereign immunity in particular pending case—but rather 
rested on statutory interpretation grounds. Specifically, Roberts opined that the 
Gun Lake Act, in fact, failed to restore the sovereign immunity of the United 
States because it did not use the words like “immunity” or “consent.”175 
Fourth, Roberts responded to Justice Breyer’s opinion that Congress was 
merely confirming, without augmenting, the law. If Congress did not alter the 
law, responded Roberts, then it could not have “changed the law” within the 
meaning of the Changed Law Rule.176 More fundamentally, Roberts objected 
that congressional action is not necessarily constitutional merely because it rati-
fies or simplifies administrative action. Instead, the touchstone of constitution-
ality is whether Congress is exercising judicial power.177 Because the Gun Lake 
Act applied the law to a particular case, Roberts opined that it is unconstitu-
tional irrespective of whether it also confirmed administrative action.178 
I explain this fractured set of opinions at length to demonstrate how some 
fundamental issues about judicial independence are still unresolved. Indeed, 
Patchak’s various opinions touch on many of the same themes as Hart’s Dia-
logue, confirming both the fundamental nature of the issues Patchak raises and 
The Dialogue’s contemporary relevance.179 The disagreements in Patchak, alt-
hough couched in fine doctrinal terms, are in reality disagreements about noth-
ing less important than the line between the judicial and legislative powers. In 
Part III, I explain how the fundamental issues raised in Patchak can be resolved 
in a way that protects the core of judicial independence while still providing 
ample room for Congress to legislate. 
III. A CHANCE FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Patchak’s fractured opinions broach an array of issues relating to the Klein 
rule of decision principle and judicial independence more generally. But, be-
cause a majority of the Court agreed on Patchak’s result without agreeing on a 
rationale, Patchak offers little guidance on what the Court might do in a slight-
ly different future case and even less guidance to lower courts on how to ap-
 
173  Id. at 920. 
174  Id. at 921–22. 
175  Id. at 922. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  Monaghan, supra note 52, at 4 (noting the contemporary relevance of Hart’s The Dia-
logue). 
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proach these important issues.180 In this Part, I address the issues joined, but not 
settled, in Patchak, including: the scope of the Changed Law Rule; the constitu-
tionality of targeted legislation; what it means for Congress to withdraw juris-
diction over a “class of cases;” and the relationship between sovereign immuni-
ty and the rule of decision principle. After exploring the dispute over each of 
these issues, I suggest how the courts, including the Supreme Court, should ap-
proach them in a future case. Although there are no easy answers to the ques-
tions raised in Patchak, following the suggestions set out below will allow 
courts to preserve the core judicial role without encroaching on Congress’s leg-
islative function. 
A. The Changed Law Rule 
Patchak’s plurality and dissent squarely join issue on the breadth of the 
Changed Law Rule. In Thomas’s view, any statute changes the law sufficient to 
defeat an application of Klein, even a statute that makes an exception to the 
generally applicable law for a single piece of property.181 As Thomas crisply 
reasoned, by withdrawing jurisdiction over claims relating the Bradley Proper-
ty, the Gun Lake Act “changes the law . . . . Before the Gun Lake Act, federal 
courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions. Now they do not.”182 Roberts, by 
contrast, reads a limitation into the Changed Law Rule, suggesting that not eve-
ry statute “changes the law” in a way that defeats Klein.183 In a sense, this dis-
pute is the most important one in Patchak. If Thomas is correct, then no statute 
ever can be invalid under the Klein rule of decision principle because the 
Changed Law Rule is coextensive with it.184 
1. The Overbreadth of Thomas’s Approach 
Thomas’s rendering of the Changed Law Rule is too broad to comport ei-
ther with Klein or with Thomas’s own stated justification for the Changed Law 
Rule. First, Thomas’s Changed Law Rule is at odds with Klein itself. The ap-
 
180  Lower courts disagree about how to apply the rule in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977), which provides that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no sin-
gle rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on 
the narrowest grounds . . . .’ ” Under one approach to this test, a position is the narrowest 
ground when its reasoning implicitly has been approved by a majority who support the re-
sult. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc). Under a second ap-
proach, a position is the narrowest ground for the result when it would change the law the 
least, or be most specific to the case being decided. See Bormuth v. Cnty. of Jackson, 849 
F.3d 266, 279 (6th Cir. 2017). 
181  Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905. 
182  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
183  Id. at 920 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he concept of ‘changing the law’ must imply 
some measure of generality or preservation of an adjudicative role for the courts.”). 
184  See supra Section I.B. 
21 NEV. L.J. 531 
562 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:2 
 
propriations proviso held unconstitutional in Klein changed the law within 
Thomas’s definition of that concept. Recall that Klein’s appropriations proviso 
required the court to dismiss claims that were predicated on evidence that the 
claimant took an oath of loyalty.185 Under Thomas’s definition of the Changed 
Law Rule, the appropriations proviso changed the law: before the proviso, fed-
eral courts had jurisdiction to hear actions predicated on evidence of a loyalty 
oath. After the appropriations proviso, they did not.186 On Thomas’s own read-
ing, therefore, there is no space for a Klein principle to operate consistent with 
the Changed Law Rule. 
Second, the vitality of Klein aside, Thomas’s reading of the Changed Law 
Rule is too broad because it conflicts with his own description of what the prin-
ciple of separation of powers requires. Thomas opined in Patchak that the prin-
ciple of separation of powers prevents Congress from “usurp[ing] a court’s 
power to interpret and apply the law to the [circumstances] before it.”187 But, 
the Changed Law Rule as Thomas envisions it validates statutes that do just 
that. In Robertson, the Court (in an opinion by Thomas himself) upheld the 
Northwest Timber Compromise, which directed the federal courts to interpret a 
statute in a particular way for three pending cases.188 The Court held that this 
statute changed the law.189 If a statute that directs courts to interpret a statute in 
a particular way for a pending case changes the law in a way that defeats the 
application of Klein, then there would seem to be no statute that could encroach 
on the judicial power.190 The breadth of Thomas’s approach to the Changed 
Law Rule warrants a search for a different approach to this principle. 
2. Three Narrower Approaches 
Justice Thomas’s Changed Law Rule is inconsistent both with Klein and 
with even an extremely modest view of judicial independence. A narrower def-
inition of what it means to change the law, by contrast, not only makes it possi-
ble to reconcile the Changed Law Rule and the Klein rule of decision principle 
but it also preserves the core of judicial independence. 
 
185  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 143 (1871) (describing operation of pro-
viso). 
186  Cf. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905, 909 (“Before the Gun Lake Act, federal courts had juris-
diction to hear these actions. Now they do not.” (internal citation omitted)). 
187  Id. at 905 (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted). 
188  Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 429–30 (1992) (describing effect of 
Compromise). 
189  Id. at 438 (“We conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) compelled changes in law . . . .”). 
190  Thomas’s opinion in Patchak itself confirms this point. See Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 908. 
Patchak reaffirmed Bank Markazi, which interpreted the law for one particular set of cases. 
Id. If the Bank Markazi statute changed the law within the meaning of the Changed Law 
Rule, then there is no constitutional line between law-making and law-application. 
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First, the Changed Law Rule and the Klein rule of decision principle can 
coexist if changing the law in a way that defeats the application of Klein means 
setting policy. As I have argued elsewhere,191 although most statutes, no matter 
how modest, indisputably set policy, a statute that does little or nothing other 
than to decide pending cases does not set policy and should not be considered 
to change the law in a way that defeats the application of Klein. 
Reading the Changed Law Rule to distinguish between setting policy and 
deciding pending cases fits neatly with constitutional law doctrine outside of 
the Klein context. In United States v. Winstar,192 the government encouraged 
healthy banks to take over insolvent savings and loans by promising the banks 
favorable accounting treatment.193 These promises were made through “express 
arrangements between the regulators and the acquiring institutions.”194 Soon 
after banks merged with the insolvent institutions, Congress prohibited the 
government from keeping its regulatory promises, rendering many of the 
merged institutions instantly insolvent.195 Justice Souter, for a plurality, opined 
that deference to Congress’s decision to invalidate the government’s promises 
was not warranted because the statute shifted the costs of the government’s 
breach of promise to particular parties.196 Souter noted that deference to Con-
gress’s decision to alter its obligations is appropriate only if this decision is 
“merely incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental objec-
tive.”197 By contrast, if the statute appears to be doing little other than shifting 
the costs of governmental decisions to particular parties, the Court will not de-
fer to the statute because it does not set policy.198 Importantly, Souter was keen-
ly aware that the government’s cost-shifting maneuver was in the public inter-
est.199 Nevertheless, a purpose to promote the general welfare did not insulate 
the government from its decision to shift the costs of the government’s decision 
to particular parties.200 
The Winstar approach can be adapted easily to the Changed Law Rule. 
Most statutes, even quite narrow ones, set policy because they achieve a gov-
ernmental objective broader than merely shifting the costs of governmental de-
 
191  Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2206–07 (arguing that the Changed Law Rule should be 
read to distinguish between statutes that set policy and statutes that do not set policy); Evan 
C. Zoldan, Is the Federal Judiciary Independent of Congress?, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
135, 139–40 (2018) [hereinafter Zoldan, Federal Judiciary] (same). 
192  United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 839 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
193  Id. at 848–51 (describing goodwill program). 
194  Id. at 853–54. 
195  Id. at 845–48. 
196  Id. at 900–03. 
197  Id. at 897–98 (emphasis added). 
198  Id. 
199  Id. at 903. 
200  Id. (noting that the public interest-serving aspect of the statute does not necessarily make 
it a public and general law). 
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cisions to particular private parties. For example, a statute prohibiting or penal-
izing a class of conduct (say, discharging pollutants)201 would set policy within 
the meaning of Winstar. Although such a statute raises costs for potential pol-
luters, it does not raise costs for particular, identifiable parties. Rather, the cate-
gory of potential polluters is an indeterminate class because others might be-
come polluters in the future and current polluters might cease polluting. As a 
result, this kind of statute achieves a government objective (penalizing pollu-
tion) rather than merely shifting costs to particular, identifiable polluters. By 
contrast, a statute that breaches a particular set of agreements (as in Winstar), 
or a statute that directs the result only in a particular, pending case, merely 
shifts costs to identifiable parties and therefore does not achieve a governmen-
tal objective other than to penalize identifiable members of a class. 
Admittedly, and as Professor Araiza has noted, the Winstar approach re-
quires some line-drawing to determine whether a very narrow statute sets poli-
cy or merely shifts costs.202 In rare cases, perhaps in a case like Patchak itself, 
this will be a difficult task. Because Patchak’s lawsuit was prompted by a sin-
gle lawsuit about a specific governmental decision and a particular piece of 
land,203 the Gun Lake Act can be seen as a cost-shifting measure to relieve the 
government of the responsibility of answering for its actions in court. Whether 
the Gun Lake Act did anything other than merely shift costs turns on the inter-
pretation of the Gun Lake Act. On one hand, as Roberts suggested,204 the pur-
pose of the statute was to require the dismissal of Patchak’s claim.205 On this 
interpretation, the Gun Lake Act merely shifted costs for a pending case and 
did not set policy.206 On the other hand, in Thomas’s view, the plain language 
of the Gun Lake Act applies to all cases, even possible future cases, relating to 
the Bradley Property. 207 On this reading, the Gun Lake Act did set policy—the 
 
201  E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“[T]he discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be un-
lawful.”). 
202  Araiza has argued that a Winstar-inspired approach to Klein is difficult or impossible to 
apply as a theoretical matter. William Araiza, The Once and (Maybe) Future Klein Princi-
ple, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 383, 394–95 (2018). While Araiza is surely correct that 
this test does not provide a bright-line rule to distinguish close cases, a bright-line rule may 
not be realistic for a complex separation of powers issue like Klein’s rule of decision princi-
ple. The Winstar principle articulated here is coherent because there are cases that easily vio-
late the principle and cases that easily survive the principle. There are cases on the line, but 
courts make decisions all the time that call on them to distinguish close cases. 
203  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 897 (2018). 
204  Id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (opining that the Gun Lake Act dictates “a particular 
outcome” to “a particular party”). 
205  Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2(b), 128 Stat. 1913 
(2014) (narrowly reaching a single pending case). 
206  For more on the Winstar approach to Patchak, see Zoldan, Federal Judiciary, supra note 
191 at 138–40. 
207  Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 910 (“Nothing on the face of § 2(b) is limited to Patchak’s case, or 
even to his challenge under the Indian Reorganization Act. Instead, the text extends to all 
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policy to end litigation over the Bradley Property. This interpretive dispute 
demonstrates that difficult issues of statutory interpretation can give rise to 
close cases, even under the formulation I suggest. However, because it is often 
easy to determine whether a statute applies to a closed class of cases or an open 
class, most cases will be resolved with little difficulty, making the policy / cost-
shifting dichotomy a meaningful if not perfect distinction. 
Second, and related to the policy / cost-shifting distinction drawn above, 
the Changed Law Rule could be read to require a court to apply a statutory 
change only if it changes the generally applicable law. Chief Justice Roberts 
made this suggestion in his Patchak dissent.208 To Roberts, a statutory change 
that applies to a single pending case is not a change of law that can defeat the 
application of Klein. The Chief Justice’s suggestion hints at the possibility that 
targeted legislation is constitutionally suspect simply because it is targeted. 
There is merit to the Chief’s suggestion; indeed, a constitutional principle dis-
favoring targeted legislation is even more robust and more complex than he 
suggests. The constitutional sources of a principle prohibiting targeted legisla-
tion, and questions about the scope of this principle, are discussed more fully in 
Section III.B., below. 
Third, the ostensible conflict between the rule of decision principle and the 
Changed Law Rule turns out to be illusory if the original relationship between 
these doctrines is restored. As noted above, the evisceration of the Klein rule of 
decision principle was made possible by the inversion of the relationship be-
tween it and the Changed Law Rule.209 When Klein was decided, the Changed 
Law Rule provided that a court, even on appeal, must apply the law in force at 
the time it decides a case.210 Klein, which post-dated the Changed Law Rule, 
can be considered an exception to it, preventing the application of the Changed 
Law Rule when the new statute “prescribe[s] rules of decision to the Judicial 
Department of the government in cases pending before it.”211 Although the 
meaning of the this language is far from certain, it can easily be read more nar-
rowly than the Changed Law Rule, allowing the two doctrines to coexist. For 
example, the Klein rule of decision principle might be read to prevent the appli-
cation of new law when it purports to apply to pending cases only. This version 
of Klein can coexist with the Changed Law Rule because the two do not com-
pletely overlap; that is, this version of Klein will block some, but not all, appli-
 
suits ‘relating to’ the Bradley Property. Thus, § 2(b) survives even under the dissent’s theo-
ry: It ‘prospectively govern[s] an open-ended class of disputes’ . . . .”). 
208  Id. at 920 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (opining that changing the law implies changing 
some generally applicable law). 
209  See supra Section I.B. 
210  United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801) (“[When] subse-
quent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and 
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed . . . .”). 
211  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
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cations of the Changed Law Rule.212 There are other ways to narrow the rule of 
decision principle to make it compatible with the Changed Law Rule.213 But, at 
least, as this approach shows, the two need not conflict. As a result, it is possi-
ble to give meaning to the rule of decision principle and the Changed Law Rule 
by reading both to preserve an adjudicatory role for the courts. 
B. The Constitutionality of Targeted Legislation 
Klein’s rule of decision principle has long been considered mysterious be-
cause its result seems both intuitively correct and inconsistent with basic prin-
ciples of law.214 Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent offers a possible solution to this 
dilemma by suggesting that Klein can be justified as an implementation of a 
constitutional value that prohibits legislation targeted to reach a single case.215 
Roberts’s suggestion is promising but requires some further elaboration. 
1. A Constitutional Value of Legislative Generality 
As Roberts correctly notes, a principle that disfavors legislation targeting 
an identifiable individual (often called special legislation)216 comports with 
other areas of constitutional law. A value disfavoring special legislation makes 
sense in light of Fletcher v. Peck’s distinction between the legislature’s law-
making authority and the judiciary’s law-application function.217 After all, if 
applying the law is reserved to the executive and judicial branches, then it 
makes sense that the legislature would be prohibited from writing a statute so 
specific that it can only apply to a specific individual; such a targeted statute 
would appear to infringe on the law-application function of the other branches. 
But, a value disfavoring targeted legislation is more nuanced, more robust, and 
even more deeply ingrained in the American constitutional fabric than Roberts 
suggests. As I have argued in previous work, a principle disfavoring targeted 
legislation—which may be called a value of legislative generality—is support-
 
212  I will defend this reading of the Changed Law Rule below. Infra Section III.C. Im-
portantly, Roberts’s reading of the Changed Law Rule and the rule of decision principle is 
different than his claim that the rule of decision principle prevents Congress from interven-
ing in a single pending case. This latter claim rests on the particularity of the statute, an issue 
discussed more fully below. 
213  For example, some scholars have suggested that it applies only to constitutional claims. 
E.g., Monaghan, supra note 52, at 67 (contrasting statutory claims and constitutional claims 
in the context of Klein). 
214  Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2149 (Klein’s rule of decision principle seems at once 
“intuitively correct and too broad to be literally true”). 
215  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 915–16 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
216  Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 632 (2014) 
[hereinafter Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality] (defining special legislation). 
217  See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (distinguishing between law-
making and law-application). 
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ed by the Constitution’s history and text, and also by persuasive normative con-
siderations.218 
First, during the Confederation period, newly independent state legislatures 
enacted countless targeted statutes that imposed punishment on named individ-
uals, transferred title to land, granted individuals exemptions from the standing 
laws, and confiscated property from named individuals.219 By the mid-1780s, 
after a long decade of suffering from the repercussions of targeted legislation, 
the framing generation wholeheartedly repudiated their legislatures’ power to 
enact targeted laws.220 In their writings, speeches, and debates, members of the 
framing generation denounced their legislatures for “extending their delibera-
tions to the cases of individuals” and granting them unearned privileges and 
imposing unearned burdens on them.221 The experience of these legislative 
abuses served as a key impetus for a new national constitution.222 
Second, and based on these experiences, the constitutional text drafted by 
the framers reflects a value of legislative generality. In addition to the Bill of 
Attainder Clauses (which most directly prohibit targeted legislative punish-
ment), the Ex Post Facto, Contract, Equal Protection, Due Process, Takings, 
and General Welfare clauses also support a value of legislative generality be-
cause each can fairly be read to prohibit a certain type of particularized legisla-
tion.223 For example, although the Equal Protection Clause is primarily con-
cerned with government classifications of individuals,224 the Supreme Court has 
also emphasized that the clause prohibits legislative specification by limiting 
the government’s power to single out an individual as a “class of one.”225 Simi-
 
 218  Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 650–60 (describing a consti-
tutional principle of legislative generality); Evan C. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Compo-
nent of Legislative Generality, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 489, 489 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The 
Equal Protection Component] (distinguishing generality from equal protection); Zoldan, 
Klein, supra note 20, at 2152–53 (comparing generality with the Klein rule of decision prin-
ciple). 
219  Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 662–65 (recounting the spe-
cial legislation-related abuses of the Confederation period). 
220  Id. at 669–79 (describing the rejection of special legislation during the framing period). 
221  COUNCIL OF CENSORS, A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 35, 38 (1784) (describing Confederation-era legislative 
abuses). 
222  Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 652. (“By the close of the 
confederation period, both special privileges and special detriments were considered ‘repug-
nant to the spirit of the American republics.’ It was with these experiences, and in large part 
driven by them, that the framers of the Constitution arrived in Philadelphia in 1787.” (inter-
nal citations omitted)). 
223  Id. at 653 (describing textual support for a value of legislative generality). 
224  See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (limiting the class-of-one 
doctrine). 
225  Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (describing the class-of-one 
doctrine). For an explanation of the class of one doctrine, see Zoldan, The Equal Protection 
Component, supra note 218, at 525–31. 
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larly, although the Due Process Clause has been applied to a wide array of gov-
ernment actions, one of its oldest applications prohibits the legislature from 
“taking the property of A and giving it to B.”226 In this same way, each of the 
clauses identified above contains a component that reinforces legislative gener-
ality, either because of the effect given to it by the Court or the historical expe-
riences that gave rise to its inclusion in the Constitution. Reading these clauses 
together suggests that a value of legislative generality pervades the Constitution 
and should inform its interpretation.227 
Third, jurists, philosophers of law, and other commentators have long ar-
gued either that targeted legislation is outside the legislative power altogether 
or that it is bad law. Locke wrote that the legislature may not “rule by extempo-
rary arbitrary decrees”228 and its laws may not be varied “in particular cases.”229 
The United States Supreme Court invoked this tradition in Hurtado v. Califor-
nia when it noted that “not every act, legislative in form” can be considered 
“law.”230 Specifically, “a special rule for a particular person or a particular 
case,” including “acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts direct-
ly transferring one man’s estate to another,” are simply excluded from its defi-
nition.231 As a normative matter, special legislation is often associated with cor-
ruption, animus, favoritism, and unjustified inequalities,232 leading 
commentators to conclude that it is “unjust,”233 “unfair,”234 and iniquitous.235 
2. Applying a Value of Legislative Generality 
A Klein principle that prohibits Congress from directing the result in pend-
ing cases is consistent with the constitutional value of legislative generality de-
scribed above. Indeed, such a principle resonates strongly with the historical 
underpinnings of the Constitution: Confederation-era legislative interference 
 
226  JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 52–53 (2003); see also Calder v. 
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (noting that impropriety of “a law that takes property 
from A. and gives it to B”). 
227  Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 653 (describing the Constitu-
tion’s generality clauses). 
228  JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 136 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) 
(1690). 
229  Id. § 142. 
230  Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884). 
231  Id. at 535–36. 
232  Evan C. Zoldan, Legislative Design and the Controllable Costs of Special Legislation, 78 
MD. L. REV. 415, 415 (2019) [hereinafter Zoldan, Legislative Design] (describing costs of 
special legislation). 
233  MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS 173 (James E. G. 
Zerzel ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). 
234  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 47 (12th prtg. 1980). 
235  JAMES H. DOUGLAS, RECORDS OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 
67–68 (Paul S Gillies & D. Gregory Sanford eds. 1991). 
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with court judgments was a key factor precipitating the Philadelphia Conven-
tion.236 A Klein principle prohibiting Congress from directing the result in a 
pending case is also consistent with, if not directly compelled by, the Constitu-
tion’s prohibition on certain types of special laws. And a Klein principle also 
resonates with the normative justifications for a value of legislative generality 
because legislation that targets a pending case is apt to be based on animus or 
favoritism.237 
There are difficult questions, to be sure, that must be answered before the 
Court could apply a value of legislative generality in the context of Klein. 
Many of these questions are raised, either explicitly or implicitly, in the ex-
change between Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice in Patchak. As Justice 
Thomas noted, at least as a formal matter, the Gun Lake Act did not apply to a 
single case alone.238 It was written in general language, applying to “an action 
pending in a Federal court” rather than to Patchak’s case specifically.239 More-
over, the Gun Lake Act required the dismissal of any claim relating to the 
Bradley Property.240 As a result, on its face it applies to future actions relating 
to the Bradley Property, even if these future actions are unrelated to the suit al-
ready dismissed.241 The Chief Justice responded to these arguments by noting 
that the “practical operation” of the statute “unequivocally confirms that it con-
cerns solely Patchak’s suit.”242 
As this exchange suggests, there are a number of difficult issues that will 
arise if a court seeks to apply a value of legislative generality in the Klein con-
text. These include the following: whether a targeted statute is impermissible 
even if it does not name the individual case targeted; whether it is impermissi-
ble to target, not only an individual case, but also a small group of cases; and 
whether a statute is impermissibly targeted if some, but not all, of the targeted 
cases are determined at the time it is enacted. 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court would not be writing on a blank slate when 
answering these and many other questions about the precise contours of a value 
of legislative generality. In previous work, I have set out the core commitments 
 
236  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1330 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the early state legislative abuses included interference “in cases still pending before 
courts, [and] granting continuances, stays of judgments,” and new trials). 
237  The statute upheld in Bank Markazi, for example, transferred property from an unsympa-
thetic party (the Central Bank of Iran) to sympathetic parties (victims of state-sponsored ter-
rorism). Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. § 8772. 
238  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2018) (noting the general applicability of the Act). 
239  Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2(b), 128 Stat. 1913 
(2014). 
240  Id. 
241  Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 910. Whether Thomas is correct, or whether the Chief Justice is 
correct that all other claims related to the Bradley Property are barred by statutes of limita-
tions, is a matter of statutory interpretation. 
242  Id. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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of a value of legislative generality and general principles to guide courts in pe-
ripheral cases. Succinctly stated, the value of “legislative generality disfavors 
legislation that singles out a person or small, identifiable group for special 
treatment to which the general population is not subject.”243 Its core commit-
ments, most relevant here, include prohibiting the legislature from: “interfering 
with both civil and criminal judicial processes for named claimants or defend-
ants; declaring the proper interpretation of a standing law in a particular 
case; . . . and transferring property from one person to another.”244 
Outside of these core commitments, my previous work suggests that the 
value of legislative generality should be less restrictive when it comes to “spe-
cial laws that prefigure generally applicable laws” or “that eliminate, rather 
than create, disparities between people.”245 
In addition to this theoretical work, state courts have extensive practical 
experience resolving these very issues under state constitutional prohibitions on 
special legislation.246 To give a sense of the answers they have reached, state 
courts tend to hold that a statute can be prohibited as special legislation even if 
it does not name the individual it targets.247 Similarly, state courts sometimes 
invalidate a statute as impermissibly special even if it applies to a small, known 
group rather than a single individual.248 Finally, state courts tend to evaluate a 
facially general statute based on whether it applies to an “open class” or a 
“closed class.”249 A class is closed if it is impossible, or extremely unlikely, that 
another person or entity will fall within the statutory classification in the future. 
 
243  Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 688. 
244  Id. at 688–89. 
245  Id. at 689. 
246  DANIEL R. MANDELKER, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, JANICE C. GRIFFITH, EVAN C. ZOLDAN 
& CYNTHIA BAKER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 670 (9th ed. 
2020) (noting that courts often invalidate statutes as special even though they do “not name a 
particular entity”); id. at 671 (“Courts often invalidate . . . narrowly drawn statutes as special 
laws.”); id. at 669 (“[C]ourts often hold that a challenged law is special when it creates a 
‘closed class.’ ”). 
247  Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 431 A.2d 663, 673 (Md. 1981) (“[S]tatutory 
provisions which did not name particular individuals or entities have been held to be prohib-
ited special laws, whereas enactments naming specific entities have been held not to be spe-
cial laws.” (citations omitted)); City of Topeka v. Gillett, 4 P. 800, 804 (Kan. 1884) (“[A]n 
act . . . may be special where it simply describes the particular persons or things so that they 
may be known, as well as where it gives their particular names or distinctive appellations.”). 
248  People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 385 (Colo. 2005) (statute creating class of two co-
conspirators violated prohibition on special legislation); Opyt’s Amoco, Inc. v. Vill. of S. 
Holland, 568 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ill. 1991) (“Special legislation confers a special benefit or 
exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly sit-
uated.”). 
249  Canister, 110 P.3d at 384 (“By contrast, a class that is drawn so that it will never have 
any members other than those targeted by the legislation is illusory, and the legislation creat-
ing such a class is unconstitutional special legislation.”); Sierra Club v. Dep’t. of Transp., 
202 P.3d 1226, 1276 (Haw. 2009) (invalidating a statute as a special law when, although 
framed as a general law, in reality it applied only to a closed class of one). 
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Courts tend to find that a generally written statute that creates a closed class is 
prohibited as special legislation.250 By contrast, courts tend to uphold classifica-
tions when a statute creates an “open” class, that is, a class into which other 
people or entities could fall in the future.251 
The Supreme Court is not, of course, required to follow the path that state 
courts have taken. But, the Court may find the states’ doctrinal solutions useful 
because, for many questions about special legislation, the states have articulat-
ed relatively manageable standards. At the very least, reviewing the states’ ap-
proaches will give the Court a sense of the types of issues that it will need to 
resolve in order to apply Klein’s rule of decision principle in light of a value of 
legislative generality. 
C. A “Class of Cases” 
Closely related to the issue of legislative generality is the issue of what 
constitutes a “class of cases.” As Justice Thomas noted in Patchak, the Klein 
Court specifically reaffirmed that Congress has the power to withdraw jurisdic-
tion over a “class of cases.”252 Because the Gun Lake Act applied to cases relat-
ing to the Bradley Property, Thomas opined that it withdrew jurisdiction over a 
class of cases within the meaning of Klein.253 Chief Justice Roberts did not de-
ny this reading of Klein, instead arguing that, as a practical matter, the Gun 
Lake Act withdrew jurisdiction over just one case, Patchak’s suit against the 
United States.254 He concluded that the Gun Lake Act did not, therefore, with-
draw jurisdiction over a “class of cases.”255 Although Roberts implies that a 
single case is not a class of cases, and Thomas implies that any number of cases 
greater than one is a class, both Roberts and Thomas carefully avoided defining 
what constitutes a class. As described below, a more nuanced approach than the 
ones suggested by Thomas or Roberts better explains what Klein’s “class of 
cases” should mean. 
1. A Class of Cases v. a Single Case 
The simplest way to define a class of cases is to follow the line of reason-
ing suggested by Justice Thomas. Noting that the Gun Lake Act required the 
dismissal of more than one case, Thomas neatly concluded that it withdrew ju-
 
250  MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 246, at 669–70 (“[C]ourts often hold that a challenged 
law is special when it creates a ‘closed class.’ A class is closed rather than open if it is im-
possible, or extremely unlikely, that another person or entity will fall within the statutory 
classification in the future.”). 
251  Id. at 670 (“Conversely, courts tend to uphold classifications that are narrowly drawn if 
the class is ‘open,’ that is, if other people or entities may fall into the class in the future.”). 
252  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906–07 (2018). 
253  Id. at 909. 
254  Id. at 916–17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
255  Id. at 918. 
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risdiction over a “class of cases.”256 Although he did not say so explicitly, 
Thomas’s conclusion can be taken as implicitly assuming that any number of 
cases greater than one is a class within the meaning of Klein. 
The major advantage of this suggested rule is that it is relatively easy to 
administer: whether a statute applies to a single case or to more than one case 
normally can be discerned from the text of a statute and its legislative context. 
Consider the statute that created a special exemption allowing the appointment 
of James Mattis as Secretary of Defense.257 As the language of the statute made 
clear, it was a “limited exception,” applying “only to the first person appointed 
as Secretary of Defense” and to “no other person.”258 To erase all doubt about 
the bill’s reach, its proponents introduced the bill as “a one-time exemption on 
behalf of an individual” that would not “permanently change the law.”259 Just 
as the text and legislative context made clear that the Mattis waiver statute ap-
plied to one person, similarly, it will be easy to determine, for many statutes, 
whether they apply to a single case or more than one case. 
However, even clear statutory language can give rise to grey areas. The 
legislation upheld in Bank Markazi, for example, deemed the assets of Bank 
Markazi to be the assets of Iran, but only for one particular, consolidated action 
involving nineteen judgments and more than a thousand victims.260 On one 
hand, the statute affected only a single pending case. But, on the other hand, 
because the single case was a consolidated action of nineteen judgments, it can 
also be viewed as more than one case. As this ambiguity reveals, a rule that dis-
tinguishes between a single case and more than one case does not neatly re-
solve all situations. 
Another advantage of Thomas’s bright-line rule is that it is consistent with 
the constitutional value of legislative generality. As noted, a value of legislative 
generality prevents the legislature from targeting an individual for special 
treatment, which is often associated with corruption, animus, favoritism, or 
other costs.261 A rule that prevents the application of a change in law to a single 
case advances the value of legislative generality by preventing the legislature 
from targeting an individual case and imposing these kinds of costs. A rule that 
distinguishes between a single case and any number of cases greater than one, 
however, is not a perfect fit with a value of legislative generality. Legislation 
that targets a group of identifiable individuals creates many of the same costs as 
 
256  Id. at 910 (plurality opinion). 
257  Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, 131 Stat. 6 (creating a special exception for 
James Mattis). 
258  Id. 
259  163 CONG. REC. H9,480 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2017) (statement of Rep. Dan Newhouse). 
260  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1326–27 (2016). This ambiguity was raised 
in the Bank Markazi Supreme Court oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Bank 
Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770). 
261  Zoldan, Legislative Design, supra note 232, at 418–19, 426–42 (enumerating the costs 
associated with special legislation). 
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legislation that targets a single individual.262 Because the legislature knows who 
will benefit or suffer from the targeted legislation,263 legislation targeting both 
an individual and a group of known individuals can be prompted by corruption, 
animus, favoritism, or other illegitimate motives. As a result, a rule that distin-
guishes between a single case and any number of cases greater than one will 
not prevent legislation creating many of the harms that a more nuanced value of 
legislative generality could address. 
Weighed against these imperfect advantages, there are also significant 
drawbacks to a rule that turns on a precise number of cases. Defining a class of 
cases for the purposes of Klein in this way will often lead to an arbitrary dis-
tinction between statutes that are similar in a relevant way. 
For example, consider again Robertson’s Northwest Timber Compromise, 
which instructed the federal courts to interpret the environmental and land 
management statutes underlying three named lawsuits in favor of the suits’ de-
fendants.264 By requiring the court to interpret statutory terms in a particular 
way, Congress arguably encroached on the independence of the courts, usurp-
ing the judicial function. But, whatever the severity of the encroachment on the 
courts, it had little to do with the precise number of cases that were affected. 
Had the statute directed the court to interpret the generally applicable law for 
one particular lawsuit rather than three, the incursion into the judicial role 
would have been fundamentally the same. A Klein principle that prevents Con-
gress from directing the result in a single case, but is powerless if Congress di-
rects the result in two or three related suits, would be easily evaded and lead to 
arbitrary distinctions between similar situations.265 
Finally, a Klein rule that distinguishes between a single case and any num-
ber of cases greater than one is contrary to the holding in Klein itself. The ap-
propriations proviso invalidated in Klein did not merely require dismissal of 
Klein’s case.266 Rather, it required the dismissal of a group of cases that fit a 
particular description: that is, cases in which a plaintiff had prevailed in the 
Court of Claims, relying on evidence of an oath of loyalty, against the United 
 
262  People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 381 (Colo. 2005) (invalidating as special statute apply-
ing to two people). 
263  Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 654 (noting that one cost of 
special legislation is legislative targeting). 
264  Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 437–38 (1992) (describing impact of 
Compromise on pending cases). 
265  Conversely, there may be situations where a statute applies to one individual but appears 
justified in some way. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 472, 477 
(1977), the Court upheld a law confiscating the papers of former President Nixon because he 
was a “legitimate class of one.” 
266  Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235; see also Tyler, supra note 109, at 94–95 
(noting that the appropriations proviso was intended to apply to multiple cases brought by 
former rebels). 
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States.267 As a result, when the Klein Court distinguished the group of cases af-
fected by the appropriations proviso from a “class of cases,” it must have used 
“class of cases” to mean something other than any number of cases greater than 
one. Contrary to Thomas’s argument, therefore, Patchak cannot be distin-
guished from Klein on the basis of the number of suits affected. If Klein is still 
good law, as Thomas suggested, then a “class of cases” must mean something 
other than any number of cases greater than one. 
2. A Class of Cases v. Pending Cases Only 
Klein itself suggests an approach to defining a “class of cases” that is supe-
rior to the distinction between a single case and any number of cases greater 
than one. When the Klein Court approved Congress’s authority to withdraw ju-
risdiction from the federal courts in “a particular class of cases,”268 it contrasted 
this power with the appropriations proviso, which unconstitutionally prescribed 
a rule of decision to a court “in cases pending before it.”269 This statement can 
be read as expressing a concern not with the application of new law to pending 
cases (which is generally permitted under the Changed Law Rule),270 but rather 
as a concern with the application of new law to pending cases only. Under this 
reading of a “class of cases,” the problem with the appropriations proviso was 
that there were no cases other than pending cases to which it could have ap-
plied.271 
The modern Supreme Court has not followed this reading of Klein. As de-
scribed above, the statute upheld in Bank Markazi explicitly applied to a pend-
ing case alone.272 Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court again addresses the 
rule of decision principle, it should consider adopting an approach that distin-
guishes between statutes that reach pending cases alone and statutes that reach 
both pending and future cases. Unlike the rule suggested by Thomas, this ap-
proach is easy for courts to administer in a principled way. This approach also 
coheres with the constitutional value of legislative generality; but, unlike a rule 
that places conclusive weight on the number of cases affected, it does so in a 
way that better accounts for the value of legislative generality’s underlying 
 
267  Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235. 
268  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145 (1871). 
269  Id. at 146. 
270  United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801) (upholding statute 
that changed the law in a case on appeal). 
271  Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235 (applying retrospectively to pardons al-
ready offered and accepted); see also Tyler, supra note 109 at 94–95 (noting that the con-
gressional proponent of the proviso estimated the government’s liability to former rebels un-
der the Abandoned and Captured Property Act at more than ten million dollars). 
272  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318–19 (2016) (noting that statute at issue 
applied to a single consolidated case). 
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concerns. And, unlike a rule that turns on whether a single case or more than 
one case is affected, this approach is consistent with Klein itself.273 
First, a Klein rule that permits statutes to apply to pending cases so long as 
it also applies to future, unknown cases is easy to administer. The statutory lan-
guage itself will often determine conclusively whether a statute applies to pend-
ing cases only. In Bank Markazi, for example, the legislation deemed the assets 
of Bank Markazi to be the assets of Iran, but only for ongoing litigation.274 In 
that case it is easy to tell that the legislation applied to a pending case (or pend-
ing cases) and could not apply to future, unknown cases. Because this approach 
does not turn on the precise number of pending cases, it also eliminates grey 
areas created by an approach that focuses exclusively on the number of cases 
affected. 
Second, as noted above, a rule that turns on whether one case or more than 
one case is affected aligns it with the value of legislative generality.275 Howev-
er, for many of the reasons that legislation targeting a single individual has 
been called unjust, legislation that targets a group of identifiable individuals al-
so can be considered unjust. For example, because the legislature knows who 
will benefit or suffer from the targeted legislation, legislation targeting both an 
individual and a small group of known individuals can be prompted by corrup-
tion, animus, favoritism, or other illegitimate motives.276 As a result, a rule that 
prevents the application of new law to a fixed universe of cases that are known 
because they are already pending will be more closely aligned with a value of 
legislative generality than a rule that is powerless when a statute targets two or 
more pending cases. 
An approach that turns on whether a change in law applies to pending cas-
es only rather than on the absolute number of individuals targeted by the legis-
lation also comports with the approach taken by state courts enforcing re-
strictions on targeted legislation under state constitutional law. When a statute 
creates a closed class, one that cannot be augmented in the future, state courts 
 
273  There are other plausible definitions of the term “class of cases.” One alternative is that 
Klein used the term in the sense of “class legislation,” a constitutional doctrine important 
until the early 20th century. Class legislation is “legislation that singles out a class for special 
treatment without a concomitant public purpose.” Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, 
supra note 218, at 505. Impermissible class legislation is distinguished from permissible leg-
islation that legislates for a natural or real class. People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 383 (Colo. 
2005). On this view, Klein may have held that the proviso was impermissible class legisla-
tion because it singled out a group of cases that was a subpart of a real or natural class. The 
class legislation theory is no longer enforced as a stand-alone principle under the federal 
Constitution. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 218, at 524–25. 
274  Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319. 
275  See supra Section III.B. 
276  Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 218, at 496 (“After all, a statute 
that singles out a small, determinable group raises many of the same concerns—like favorit-
ism, animus, or encroachment on the judicial function—that attend individualized legisla-
tion.”). 
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often invalidate the legislation as impermissibly special.277 When legislation 
creates a class that includes known individuals, but which also could apply to 
others in the future, courts tend to uphold it because it creates an open class.278 
Legislation that affects pending cases maps on to this open-class / closed-class 
dichotomy. When legislation affects pending cases alone, it creates a closed 
class, whose members have been selected by the legislature for special treat-
ment, perhaps with an impermissible motive. By contrast, when legislation ap-
plies to pending and future cases, the legislature acts, in part, from behind a 
veil of ignorance, unaware of the full spectrum of cases that will be affected by 
the change in law.279 The fact that the legislature cannot know everyone who 
will be affected by a change makes it less likely that the legislature will use this 
instrument to target known individuals because they cannot do so without risk-
ing unintended applications. 
Third, unlike a rule that distinguishes between a single case and any num-
ber greater than one, an approach that distinguishes between pending cases only 
and pending and future cases is consistent with Klein itself. As noted, the Klein 
Court distinguished between “a particular class of cases,” over which Congress 
has complete control, and a statute that unlawfully prescribes a rule of decision 
to the courts “in cases pending before it.”280 This distinction demonstrates that 
the Klein Court considered it possible that withdrawing jurisdiction may be un-
lawful even if more than one case is affected by the change in law. 
Finally, this approach also makes sense of a somewhat cryptic passage in 
Klein, in which the Court distinguished the appropriations proviso from the 
statute it previously upheld in Wheeling Bridge.281 Wheeling Bridge arose from 
the Court’s previous injunction against the operation of a bridge, which the 
Court enjoined after finding that the bridge was a nuisance.282 After the opera-
tion of the bridge was enjoined, however, Congress enacted a statute that de-
clared the bridge was not a nuisance.283 In Wheeling Bridge, the Court upheld 
 
277  Canister, 110 P.3d at 384 (“By contrast, a class that is drawn so that it will never have 
any members other than those targeted by the legislation is illusory, and the legislation creat-
ing such a class is unconstitutional special legislation.”); Sierra Club v. Dep’t. of Transp., 
202 P.3d 1226, 1276 (Haw. 2009) (invalidating a statute as a special law when, although 
framed as a general law, in reality applied only to a closed class of one). 
278  MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 246, at 669–71 (discussing open class/closed class dis-
tinction). 
279  Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 399 
(2001) (arguing that the Constitution contains veil of ignorance rules that subject “deci-
sionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and burdens that will result from 
a decision”). 
280  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–46 (1871). 
281  Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 440 (1855). 
282  Id. at 447. 
283  Id. at 422. 
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the application of the new law to the pending case, which resulted in the disso-
lution of the injunction.284 
In Klein, the Court reaffirmed its previous holding in Wheeling Bridge; the 
Court distinguished this previous case on the ground that, after the new law de-
clared the bridge not to be a nuisance, the Court “was left to apply its ordinary 
rules to the new circumstances created” by the change in law.285 As a result, no 
“arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in that case.”286 By contrast, the ap-
propriations proviso was defective because it did not create new circumstances; 
instead, it required the Court to apply the law to particular pending cases. In 
making this distinction, Klein can be read to distinguish between a law that ap-
plies to pending cases alone and, on the other hand, a change in law that applies 
to pending cases and future cases. On this reading, the Wheeling Bridge statute 
was lawful because it declared that the bridge was not a nuisance—not only for 
the injunction that was then in force—but also for any future lawsuits claiming 
that the bridge was a nuisance. By contrast, the Wheeling Bridge statute would 
have been defective had it declared the bridge lawful only for the purposes of 
the injunction that was then in force. 
In sum, when the Supreme Court again addresses the definition of “class of 
cases” in the context of Klein, it should revive the distinction between statutes 
that apply to pending cases only and, on the other hand, statutes that apply both 
to pending and future cases. A definition that carries this distinction will be 
easy for courts to administer because statutory language and legislative context 
normally make clear whether a statute affects pending cases alone. This ap-
proach, moreover, is consistent with a value of legislative generality because it 
is analogous to the open-class / closed-class distinction often used to define im-
permissible special legislation. And finally, this approach not only is consistent 
with Klein, but it also makes sense of Klein’s puzzling passage distinguishing 
Wheeling Bridge. 
D. The Government’s Sovereign Immunity 
In their concurrences, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor took an approach 
to Patchak that avoided all of the thorny issues discussed above. Instead, they 
opined that the Gun Lake Act had the functional effect of asserting or restoring 
the government’s sovereign immunity because it required the federal courts to 
dismiss suits relating to the Bradley Property.287 Because some suits relating to 
the Bradley Property would lie against the United States, and because the Unit-
ed States can always assert its immunity from suit, the Gun Lake Act was valid 
 
284  Id. at 431–32. 
285  Klein, 80 U.S. at 146–47. 
286  Id. at 146. 
287  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 912–14 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring & Sotomayor, 
J., concurring). 
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even though it directed a federal court to dismiss a particular, pending suit.288 
The plurality did not address this argument; moreover, the Chief Justice failed 
to counter the ultimate constitutional point asserted in these concurrences. In-
stead, he retreated to a statutory interpretation argument, opining that the Gun 
Lake Act did not, in fact, assert the government’s sovereign immunity.289 
1. The Limits of Sovereign Immunity 
It is true that the Court has described Congress’s power to assert the gov-
ernment’s sovereign immunity in absolute terms. In a typical statement of this 
principle, the Court has held that the United States subjects itself to suit only as 
“an act of grace.”290 As a result, it may be inferred, Congress’s subsequent de-
cision to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts over a suit against the 
United States always will be honored by the courts.291 
But, despite strong rhetorical statements about the government’s consent to 
be sued, there is reason to doubt that the government’s sovereign immunity ex-
tends as far as Ginsburg and Sotomayor suggest. Most obviously, the scope of 
immunity they describe is at odds with Klein itself. The statute invalidated in 
Klein required federal courts to dismiss suits that only could be asserted against 
the United States.292 Nevertheless, the Klein Court invalidated the proviso. If 
Klein is good law, therefore, sovereign immunity, whatever its scope, does not 
insulate a statute simply because it requires dismissal of suits against the United 
States. The Klein Court made this point explicitly when it rejected the govern-
ment’s argument that “the right to sue the government . . . is a matter of fa-
vor.”293 The Court emphasized, instead, that “it is as much the duty of the gov-
ernment as of individuals to fulfil its obligations.”294 
Doctrine aside, Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s concurrences are still too broad: 
it cannot be true that any statute terminating pending suits is saved from consti-
tutional infirmity so long as it has the effect of dismissing claims against the 
United States. Imagine a statute that requires the federal courts to dismiss all 
claims asserted by a particular religious group against the United States. Be-
 
288  Id. at 912–913 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
289  Id. at 921–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
290  District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 65 (1901). 
291  Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 912 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Eslin, 183 U.S. at 65–66). 
292  Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235 (providing for the dismissal of suits 
against the United States). 
293  United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144 (1871). 
294  Id. Here, the Supreme Court paraphrased a line from President Lincoln’s First Annual 
Message: “It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself, in 
favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals.” Abraham Lin-
coln, President of the U.S., Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1861), in CONG. GLOBE, 
37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1861). An excerpt from this speech adorns the side of the Wash-
ington, D.C. building that houses both the United States Court of Federal Claims and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
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cause this statute requires the dismissal of suits against the United States, it 
would “restore[] the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity”295 as much as 
did the Gun Lake Act. But, of course, this statute also would violate other con-
stitutional provisions.296 As this example demonstrates, simply because a stat-
ute effectively asserts or “restores” the government’s sovereign immunity does 
not determine whether it also generates other constitutional problems. As a re-
sult, the fact that the Gun Lake Act required the dismissal of suits against the 
government does not determine whether it also violates the Constitution by di-
recting a federal court to enter judgment in a pending case. If the Constitution 
prohibits Congress from directing the result in a pending case, then a statute 
that does so is not redeemed by the fact that it also terminates suits against the 
government.297 
2. A Principle Against Self-Dealing 
The expansive vision of sovereign immunity proffered by Justices Gins-
burg and Sotomayor turns out to be implausibly broad. It is possible, however, 
to imagine a more modest version of sovereign immunity. In a diverse set of 
constitutional contexts,298 the Supreme Court has declined to uphold statutes 
that reflect governmental self-dealing—that is—legislation that repudiates an 
obligation of the government in a pending dispute.299 A principle that disfavors 
legislative self-dealing is more modest than Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s 
version of sovereign immunity because it protects the prerogatives of legisla-
tive power while also creating space for the independent operation of the feder-
 
295  Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 912 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
296  This statute would likely violate the Constitution’s First Amendment, among other provi-
sions. For an Article III example, consider the possibility of Congress creating a second Su-
preme Court authorized to hear appeals from judgments in which claims were asserted 
against the United States, but which is required to dismiss all cases in which the United 
States prevailed in the lower court. This provision would result in the dismissal of claims 
against the United States, but it would also arguably violate Article III by creating a court of 
last resort other than the “one Supreme Court” provided for in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 1. 
297  For a similar reason, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion that Congress may always law-
fully “confirm” administrative action that is itself constitutional is unpersuasive. For exam-
ple, while an agency head may lawfully appoint inferior officers, it is unconstitutional for 
Congress itself to appoint inferior officers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. As a result, whether a 
statute “confirms” administrative action does not determine whether it is otherwise unconsti-
tutional. 
298  E.g., U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 1 (1977) (refusing to defer to states’ deci-
sion to breach bond obligations); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350 (1935) (holding 
that the United States “is [not] free to ignore that pledge and alter the terms of its obligations 
in case a later Congress finds their fulfillment inconvenient”); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 
513, 514 (2000) (retrospective rules that inure only to the benefit of the state implicate ex 
post facto concerns). 
299  For an argument that the Klein rule of decision principle reflects a constitutional principle 
against self-dealing, see Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2190–94. 
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al courts. Examining some of the Court’s self-dealing cases suggests a princi-
pled way for courts to determine whether to uphold a statutory change in law 
that has the effect of terminating suits against the United States. 
In Winstar, the government was liable for breaching an agreement with 
private parties because Congress’s repudiation of the government’s agreement 
reflected self-dealing.300 The government was engaged in self-dealing because 
the statute that repudiated its contract appeared to be an act of an interested par-
ty rather than the act of a regulating sovereign.301 The plurality suggested a slid-
ing scale to determine whether the government may break its promise in the 
course of regulating.302 A statute that impairs the government’s obligations, but 
which does so only incidental to “the accomplishment of a broader governmen-
tal objective,” will be permitted as a disinterested, sovereign act.303 However, 
the “greater the Government’s self-interest . . . the more suspect becomes the 
claim that its private contracting partners ought to bear the financial burden.”304 
And if “a substantial part of the impact of the Government’s action rendering 
performance impossible falls on its own contractual obligations,” the govern-
ment must honor its agreement.305 
Similarly, in Perry v. United States,306 the Court rebuffed Congress’s at-
tempt to claim immunity from suit for reneging on an obligation.307 The Court 
held that the United States is not free to “alter the terms of its obligations in 
case a later Congress finds their fulfillment inconvenient.”308 Indeed, while 
Congress has a relatively free hand to regulate contractual obligations general-
ly, this freedom does not extend to the government’s power “to alter or repudi-
ate the substance of its own engagements.”309 The Court specifically rejected 
the government’s argument that, as a sovereign, Congress could not be bound 
to its contractual obligations.310 The power to enter into binding contracts is it-
self a sovereign power, the Court reasoned; therefore, disclaiming a previous 
contractual obligation is as much a repudiation of sovereignty as abiding by 
it.311 
 
300  United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896 (1996) (describing that statutes are 
sometimes “tainted by a governmental object of self-relief”). 
301  Id. at 902–03 (distinguishing between public and general acts and, on the other hand self-
interested acts). 
302  Id. at 896. 
303  Id. at 898. 
304  Id. (emphasis added). 
305  Id. 
306  Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
307  Id. at 350. 
308  Id. 
309  Id. at 350–51 (emphasis added). 
310  Id. at 353. 
311  Id. at 354 (“The fact that the United States may not be sued without its consent is a mat-
ter of procedure which does not affect the legal and binding character of its contracts.”). 
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In these cases, as well as in other contexts,312 the Court has refused to apply 
a change in law that would have had the effect of benefitting the government in 
pending cases when the new law reflected the government’s self-interest. In 
these cases, the Court took pains to emphasize that it will respect, and defer to, 
laws that apply even-handedly to the government and other parties. Whether a 
statute reflects disinterested regulation rather than self-interest depends on the 
extent to which the statute accomplishes some goal other than simply relieving 
the government of an obligation.313 
A principle against governmental self-dealing, as suggested by Winstar, 
Perry, and similar cases, can guide courts considering whether to apply a new 
law purporting to terminate, because of the government’s sovereign immunity, 
a suit pending against the United States. Consider how a principle against self-
dealing could be used to evaluate Patchak. The surest effect of the Gun Lake 
Act was to save the government from the burden of defending itself in the 
pending suit brought by Patchak.314 Like the statutes invalidated in Winstar and 
Perry, therefore, the Gun Lake Act repudiated the government’s obligation un-
der existing law. On the other hand, Interior’s decision to take the Bradley 
Property into trust did more than alter the government’s obligation; because it 
arguably reached all suits relating to the Bradley Property, the burden of the 
Gun Lake Act did not fall exclusively on Patchak.315 Moreover, even if, as a 
practical matter, the statute affected Patchak’s lawsuit alone, unlike the Winstar 
and Perry statutes, the Gun Lake Act created only a modest benefit for the 
United States. Other than the cost of defending against Patchak’s suit, it did not 
benefit the government financially. Instead, the stated and likely reason for the 
government’s action was to benefit the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish.316 On this 
view of the government’s action, the Gun Lake Act can be seen as part of the 
government’s effort to assist the tribe rather than to self-deal. 
The Winstar-Perry analysis will not always provide an easy answer to dif-
ficult questions about the purposes and effects of the government’s actions. 
Nevertheless, evaluating a claim of sovereign immunity in light of a principle 
against self-dealing should be attractive to courts resolving similar future cases. 
An approach based on a principle against governmental self-dealing resonates 
 
312  E.g., U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 1 (1977) (refusing to defer to states’ deci-
sion to breach bond obligations); Perry, 294 U.S. at 350 (holding that the United States is 
not “free to ignore that pledge and alter the terms of its obligations in case a later Congress 
finds their fulfillment inconvenient”); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 514 (2000) (retro-
spective rules that inure to the benefit of the government only implicate Ex Post Facto 
Clause concerns). 
313  United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 900 (invalidating statute that benefitted the 
government at the expense of private parties); Perry, 294 U.S. at 354 (same). 
314  Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 909–10 (2018) (describing the effect of the Gun Lake 
Act). 
315  Id. (describing the possible broader reach of the Gun Lake Act). 
316  Id. (describing the purpose of Interior’s decision to take the property into trust). 
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with other areas of constitutional law. It preserves both the prerogative of Con-
gress to determine its exposure to liability and the power of courts to decide 
pending cases. And perhaps most importantly, this approach rejects an implau-
sibly broad vision of sovereign immunity while still allowing the government 
to assert immunity when it regulates disinterestedly. 
CONCLUSION 
The core of judicial independence is the power of the courts to resolve cas-
es pending before them without legislative interference. But, when Congress 
directs the courts to reach particular results in pending cases, it blurs the line 
between the judicial and legislative powers. The Supreme Court has not de-
fended the core of judicial independence, instead upholding increasingly intru-
sive statutes that direct the courts to enter judgment for particular parties. Alt-
hough the line between the judicial power and legislative power is surely fuzzy, 
the Court can, and should, refine its approach to ensure that the core of judicial 
independence is not lost altogether. The Court should not apply a change in law 
to pending cases when the law fails to set policy, when it singles out an indi-
vidual for special treatment, when it withdraws jurisdiction solely for the pur-
pose of terminating pending cases, or when it reflects governmental self-
dealing. Observing these limitations on Congress’s power to direct the result in 
pending cases allows Congress ample room to fulfill its lawmaking function. 
But, unlike the Court’s current approach, it also preserves the courts’ role to 
actually decide cases rather than just enter judgment at the direction of Con-
gress. 
